"Daryl G. Press uses historical evidence to answer two crucial questions: When a country backs down in a crisis, does its credibility suffer? How do leaders assess their adversaries' credibility? Press illuminates the decision-making processes behind events such as the crises in Europe that preceded World War II, the superpower showdowns over Berlin in the 1950s and 60s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis."--Page 4 of cover.

This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to estimate firms' strategies directly and examine how these strategies determine market power. A detailed technical appendix reviews the relevant information-theoretic and other econometric models that are used throughout. Questions and detailed answers for students and researchers are provided in the book for easy use.

The technological revolution in the social sciences made available a set of research tools and data manipulation techniques that permit the study of complex social processes previously inaccessible or not amenable to our observational powers. One important set of tools took the generic title "experimental games," which were characterized by the interactive protagonists' pursuit of relatively well-defined goals whose achievement is dependent on the behavior of others. James T. Tedeschi, Barry R. Schlenker, and Thomas V. Bonoma, in this work, explicate these highly structured interactions. The grand strategy of scientific inquiry is the development of explanatory systems for natural phenomena. The empirical tactics devised to manipulate, control, observe, and measure events or processes of interest often require as much ingenuity and imagination as theory development itself. Generally the situation is so structured that certain rules govern participant behavior. Within these constraints the social psychological processes of conflict, influence, power, bargaining, and coalition formation can be studied. Concerned with the more formal and technical aspects of games, the authors explain how they are used for purposes of developing and testing scientific theory. The emphasis throughout is on the development and empirical evaluation of a scientific theory of social influence and power in situations where the interests of the interacting parties are in conflict. Experimental games have provided many of the concepts and the preponderance of evidence that have helped to unravel many of the complexities of social behavior. In Conflict, Power, and Games, the authors build a bridge between technical and non-technical approaches in order to shed greater light on interpersonal relations.

Focuses on a micro approach to political economy that grounds policy choices in the competitive environments of domestic politics and decision-making processes.

Conventional wisdom dictates that the conditions of international politics require states to pursue "tough" strategies based on threats, ruling out "soft" strategies such as reassurances or appeasement. In Threats and Promises, James W. Davis, Jr., works toward a theory of influence in international politics that recognizes the power of promises and assurances as tools of statecraft. Davis offers an analytic treatment of promises and assurances, drawing on relevant strands of international relations theory and deterrence theory, as well as cognitive and social psychology. Building on prospect theory (from cognitive psychology), he develops a testable theory of influence that suggests promises are most effective when potential aggressors are motivated by a desire to avoid loss. Davis then considers a series of case studies drawn principally from German diplomatic relations in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century. From the case studies—which focus on such issues as European stability, colonial competition, and the outbreak of the First World War—Davis shows how a blending of threats and promises according to reasoned principles can lead to a new system of more creative statecraft. While many critical analyses exist on the use of threats, there are relatively few on the use of promises. Davis argues that promises have been central to outcomes that were previously attributed to the successful use of deterrent threats, as well as the resolution of many crises where threats failed to deter aggression. Threats and Promises challenges the conventional wisdom and is an original contribution to the field of international politics.

This fully revised and updated edition of Social Psychology is an engaging exploration of the question, "what makes us who we are?" presented in a new, streamlined fashion. Grounded in the latest research, Social Psychology explains the methods by which social psychologists investigate human behavior in a social context and the theoretical perspectives that ground the discipline. Each chapter is designed to be a self-contained unit for ease of use in any classroom. This edition features new boxes providing research updates and "test yourself " opportunities, a focus on critical thinking skills, and an increased emphasis on diverse populations and their experiences.

The mental suffering and agony, the ruined lives, the broken homes and hearts, the desolation and yearning and despair – who can measure the cost of crime? Eugene Smith, 1901 The anxiety people feel towards another people – the fear of crime – lies at the foundations of human society. The enormous burden that crime imposes on societies calls for ef?cient social arrangements and institutions. While intuitively obvious, the exact scope of this burden for a long time eluded measurement. With the emergence and development of quantitative methods in economics and statistics, the exercise of calculating costs of crime became possible, and indeed has been undertaken. The emerging ?eld of assessing costs of crime is still a controversial one, both in its methodology and applications. Many people would feel it absurd to calculate costs of crimes, particularly violent ones. What is a cost of murder, rape, or assault? Can any number meaningfully represent the villainous nature of such acts? These questions are undoubtedly good ones. In this book, I will argue that we can estimate costs of different crimes, and that such estimates are relevant for criminal law and crime policy. Notwithstanding the incommensurability of many consequences of crime, society every day makes numerous decisions how to tackle crime, and at least implicitly assesses the relative importance of the problem. Properly done costs of crime estimates make people’s evaluation more visible, and allow for more coherent public policy.