Two comprehensive reports about the 1975 Mayaguez ship incident involving Cambodia are included in this reproduction: The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations * The Mayaguez Incident: Near Disaster at Koh Tang.President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the SS Mayaguez merchant ship is an important case study in national security decision making. It was the first test of the War Powers Act and the only time a president ever directly managed a crisis through the National Security Council. Significant differences existed between the military and the White House over the use of force during the crisis. While often viewed as the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Ford administration was mainly driven by concerns in Korea. The Mayaguez crisis is one of the best documented but least-understood crises in U.S. history. Copious documentation, including declassified White House meeting minutes and notes from private conversations, has not produced a good, consensus explanation for U.S. behavior. The event is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence arising from frustration over losing Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did contributes to equally confused explanations for U.S. behavior. Even President Ford never understood the exact roles his two strongest advisors, Henry A. Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger, played during the crisis. Now, however, with new sources and penetrating analysis, Christopher J. Lamb's The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations demonstrates how three decades of scholarship mischaracterized U.S. motives and why the allegation of civilian micromanagement is wrong. He then extracts lessons for current issues such as mission command philosophy, civil-military relations, and national security reform. In closing he makes the argument that the incredible sacrifices made by U.S. servicemen during the crisis might have been avoided but were not in vain.From the second book: Chaotic, confused, and incomplete planning based on faulty intelligence proved to be a recipe for disaster. During the operation, the same problems of command and control that plagued it during planning were present to a greater degree and accentuated the fog and friction of the battle. At the operational level, there was little situational awareness, and no one was in command or coordinating the battlespace. Throughout the fight, there were occasions when the Marines were nearly overrun by the numerically superior, well-trained, and disciplined enemy force. During the fourteen hour battle seemingly minor tactical events influenced the outcome. The tactical leadership, initiative, and individual heroism of countless servicemen overcame significant command and control obstacles to prevent tactical defeat and strategic failure. Superior technology and firepower did not dominate the battlefield at Koh Tang. The fighting ability, courage, and steadfast determination of Marines and airmen prevailed to achieve strategic objectives. Technology cannot replace the intangible factors that influence all levels of war.

President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the SS Mayaguez merchant ship is an important case study in national security decision making. It was the first test of the War Powers Act and the only time a president ever directly managed a crisis through the National Security Council. Significant differences existed between the military and the White House over the use of force during the crisis. While often viewed as the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Ford administration was mainly driven by concerns over Korea. The Mayaguez crisis is one of the best documented but least-understood crises in US history. Copious documentation, including declassified White House meeting minutes and notes from private conversations, has not produced a good, consensus explanation for US behavior. The event is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence arising from frustration over losing Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did contributes to equally confused explanation for US behavior. Even President Ford never understood the exact roles his two strongest advisors, Henry A. Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger, played during the crisis. Now, however, with new sources and penetrating analysis, Christopher J. Lamb's The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations demonstrates how three decades of scholarship mischaracterized US motives and why the allegation of civilian micromanagement is wrong. He then extracts lessons for current issues such as mission command philosophy, civil-military relations, and national security reform. In closing he makes the argument that the incredible sacrifices made by US servicemen during the crisis might have been avoided but were not in vain. -- Dust jacket flap.

The Mayaguez incident is a clear case in which the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war merged. The strategic objectives as determined by the National Command Authorities were to recover the ship and crew and in doing so demonstrate U.S. strength and resolve. Discussions in National Security Council meetings clearly prioritized the objectives, the most important of which was to demonstrate to the world that the United States remained an international power willing and able to defend its overseas interests. Regrettably, poor operational command and control (C2) during planning created problems that would plague the operation until its conclusion. From an execution point of view, these problems were caused by a combination of several factors. First, a joint task force, composed of units from three different services, was hastily formed and tasked to rapidly conduct a complex operation with strategic implications. Second, C2 failures during planning were caused by the absence of centralized leadership, which would have unified the effort and resulted in a cohesive task force. Three, faulty dissemination of crucial intelligence to the tactical planners and operators resulted in a flawed scheme of maneuver. These factors created a planning environment characterized by chaos and confusion. During the operation the same problems of C2 that plagued it during planning were present to an even greater degree. At the operational level, there was little situational awareness, and no one was coordinating the battlespace. Throughout the fight, there were occasions when the Marines were nearly overrun by the numerically superior, well-trained, and disciplined enemy force. During the 14-hour battle seemingly minor tactical events influenced the outcome. In the end, it was the tactical leadership, initiative, and individual heroism of countless servicemen that overcame significant C2 obstacles to prevent tactical defeat and strategic failure.

Preface -- Abbreviations -- Key figures in the Mayaguez Crisis -- Introduction -- Day one: Monday, May 12 -- Day two: Tuesday, May 13 -- Day three: Wednesday, May 14 -- Day four: Thursday, May 15 -- Critical crisis decisions -- Explaining decisions, behaviors and outcomes -- Refining the explanation: rationality, bureaucracy and beliefs -- Findings, issues, prescriptions -- Conclusion.

This publication represents the ninth volume in an operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War. This particular volume details the final chapter in the Corps’ involvement in South-East Asia, including chapters on Cambodia, the refugees, and the recovery of the container ship SS Mayaguez. Although largely written from the perspective of the III Marine Amphibious Force, this volume also describes the roles of the two joint commands operating in the region: the Defense Attaché Office, Saigon, and the United States Support Activities Group, Thailand. Thus, while the volume emphasizes the Marine Corps’ role in the events of the period, significant attention also is given to the overall contribution of these commands in executing U.S. policy in South-east Asia from 1973 to 1975. Additionally, a chapter is devoted to the Marine Corps’ role in assisting thousands of refugees who fled South Vietnam in the final weeks of that nation’s existence.