Ulf Brüggemann discusses and empirically investigates the economic consequences of mandatory switch to IFRS. He provides evidence that cross-border investments by individual investors increased following the introduction of IFRS.

How mandated disclosure took over the regulatory landscape—and why it failed Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure—requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.

The field of intellectual property has broadened and deepened in so many ways, and at such pace, that there is a tendency for academic commentators to focus on the next new thing, or to react immediately to judicial developments, rather than to reflect more deeply on the greater themes of the discipline. The Kritika: Essays on Intellectual Property series is a series of books that are designed to fulfill this role by creating a forum for essays that take a critical, long-term approach to the field of intellectual property. Breaking down the barriers of specialization, and laying the foundation for an emergent critical scholarship, this first book in the series brings together the leading scholars in the field to reflect deeply on the current state and future of their discipline.

Fiscally transparent entities and tax treaty eligibility Shefali Goradia Triangular cases – the neglected problem in tax treaty law Michael Lang Can tax treaty entitlement provisions for hybrid entities be refined? Dhruv Sanghavi Non-discrimination provisions in tax treaties Ajay Vohra Two to tango: a dance of substance and form Bijal Ajinkya Deconstructing Principal Purpose Test under Article 7 of MLI Mukesh Butani Preventing treaty abuse in the context of multilateral instrument Dinesh Kanabar and Saurabh Shah Taxation of digital economy – the journey, India and across the world Daksha Baxi Digitalisation of the economy: Our perspective on the OECD's Unified Approach Vikram Chand Reflections on the 2019 OECD proposal on Pillar One Guglielmo Maisto Implementation of BEPS and Amendments to Section 9 Radhakishan Rawal Public international law, object and purpose, MLI, BEPS and the OECD Model Tax Convention Clive M. Baxter Tax laws through a constitutional prism Arvind P. Datar Tax policy as a tool to enable impact investment and improve CSR targeting Meyyappan Nagappan and Nehal Binani Tax system design - an analysis of some design choices made by the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 Shreya Rao Through the looking glass: resolving tax disputes by arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty H. David Rosenbloom

This dissertation comprises three papers on the governance of corporate risk: 1. The first paper investigates the role of organizational structures aimed at monitoring corporate risk. Proponents of risk-related governance structures, such as risk committees or Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs, assert that risk monitoring adds value by ensuring that corporate risks are managed. An alternative view is that such governance structures are nothing more than window-dressing created in response to regulatory or public pressure. Consistent with the former view, I find that, in the period between 2000 and 2006, firms with more observable risk oversight structures exhibit lower equity and credit risk than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. I also provide evidence that firms with more observable risk oversight structures experienced higher returns during the worst days of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and were less susceptible to market fluctuations than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. Finally, I find that firms without observable risk oversight structures experienced higher abnormal returns to recent legislative events relating to risk management than firms with observable risk oversight structures. 2. The most common empirical measure of managerial risk-taking incentives is equity portfolio vega (Vega), which is measured as the dollar change in a manager's equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns. However, Vega exhibits at least three undesirable features. First, Vega is expressed as a dollar change. This implicitly assumes that managers with identical Vega have the same incentives regardless of differences in their total equity and other wealth. Second, the small change in the standard deviation of returns used to calculate Vega (i.e., 0.01) yields a very local approximation of managerial risk-taking incentives. If an executive's expected payoff is highly nonlinear over the range of potential stock price and volatility outcomes, a local measure of incentives is unlikely to provide a valid assessment of managerial incentives. Third, Vega is measured as the partial derivative of the manager's equity portfolio with respect to return volatility. This computation does not consider that this partial derivative also varies with changes in stock price. The second paper develops and tests a new measure of managerial risk-taking equity incentives that adjusts for differences in managerial wealth, considers more global changes in price and volatility, and explicitly considers the impact of stock price and volatility changes. We find that our new measure exhibits higher explanatory power and is more robust to model specification than Vegafor explaining a wide range of measures of risk-taking behavior. 3. The third paper examines the relation between shareholder monitoring and managerial risk-taking incentives. We develop a stylized model to show that shareholder monitoring mitigates the effect of contractual risk-taking incentives on the manager's actions. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that the positive association between the CEO's contractual risk-taking incentives and risk-taking behavior decreases with the level of shareholder monitoring. Furthermore, consistent with the board anticipating and optimally responding to shareholder monitoring, boards of firms exposed to more intense monitoring design compensation contracts that provide higher incentives to take risks. Overall, our results suggest that, when evaluating risk-taking incentives provided by a compensation contract, it is important to account for the firm's monitoring environment.