Essays on Microeconomics and Industrial Organisation aim to serve as a source and work of reference and consultation for the field of Microeconomics in general and of Industrial Organisation in particular. Traditionally, Microeconomics is essentially taught as theory and hardly ever an estimation of a demand, production and cost function is offered . Over the last two decades, however, Microeconomics has greatly broadened its field of empirical application. Therefore, this text combines microeconomic theories with a variety of empirical cases. The standardised microeconomic analysis of demand, production and costs is set forth along with appropriate econometric techniques. The text consists of four parts: Demand, Production and Costs (Supply), Market and Industrial Structure and Failure of Market and Industrial Regulation. It includes eleven new chapters with respect to the first edition.

Essays on Microeconomics and Industrial Organisation aims to serve as a source and work of reference and consultation for the field of Microeconomics in general and of Industrial Organisation in particular. The book consists of four parts: Demand, Production and Costs (Supply), Market and Industrial Structure, and Failures of Market and Industrial Regulation. It combines theoretical concepts and a variety of empirical cases.

This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.

Conventional economic analysis of property rights in natural resources is too narrow and restrictive to allow for effective comparisons between alternative institutional structures. In this book, a conceptual framework is developed for the analysis of the

Industrial Organization in Context examines the economics of markets, industries and their participants and public policy towards these entities. It takes an international approach and incorporates discussion of experimental tests of economic models.

This collection of work by economist, consultant, and expert witness Franklin M. Fisher constitutes an integrated body of the economic analysis of the law, with particular emphasis on antitrust issues. Fisher's involvement with applying economic analysis to real disputes and to problems of microeconomic policy has resulted in valuable lessons. These lessons are incorporated in themes running through many of these essays about the uses and abuses, achievements and shortcomings, of economic analysis.The book opens with a broad overview of key issues in antitrust law. Fisher stresses the importance of understanding the analytic tools used to examine monopoly and competition. He shows that the notion that simple indicators such as market share, or especially, profit rates can be used to provide an easy test for market power is badly mistaken. And he goes on to discuss oligopoly and its modern game theoretic treatment, which he sees as missing the questions that matter in real situations. Throughout, specific cases and policy issues are used to illustrate these important points.The second part of the book looks at the regulation of television, particularly cable, an area in which Fisher has been active since cable television's early days. The book concludes with a section on economic analysis and the law with essays on such matters as the uses of statistical methods and punishment as a deterrent to crime.Franklin M. Fisher is Professor of Economics at MIT. He was the lead expert economist for the defense, assisted by John J. McGowan and Joen E. Greenwood of Charles River Associates, in the major antitrust case U.S. v. IBM. John Monz is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at MIT.