Five years ago the world lost one of its most prolific insurance scholars, Dr. Robert I. Mehr. His death in 1988 signalled the passing of not only a gifted writer and researcher, but also a pioneering teacher, mentor, and friend. The essays compiled within this volume are intended as an appropriate tribute to this occasionally outrageous individual who touched the lives of so many within the insurance community. Bob Mehr was a teacher who expected and demanded nothing less than perfect scholarship and flawless, efficient writing. Among alumni of the University of lllinois insurance doctoral program, stories still abound of late night and early morning sessions in which students and professor painstakingly debated precise words and phrases for dissertations, journal articles, and textbooks. Bob's respect for language was both immense and contagious, if at times more than a little compulsive. He joked that he could not read letters or novels without pencil in hand for editing. Bob's respect for his doctoral students was equally evident. The confidence he displayed in his students' abilities was sometimes startling, but "competence assumed" often begot "competence in fact." The accomplishments and records amassed by the many who studied with Bob Mehr are impressive and ongoing. On the dedication page in his final textbook, Fundamentals of Insurance, Bob spoke of his affection for those he called his "academic progeny" and wished them happiness as they build their own academic families.

Orio Giarini The "Geneva Association" (International Association for the Study of Risk and Insurance Economics) was founded in 1973. The main goal was to stimulate and organize objective research in the field of risk, uncertainty, and insurance, in a world in which such issues were clearly becoming of greater and greater relevance for all economic actors. This was a pioneer ing effort, especially as economic theory and the teaching of economics were still anchored to the key notion of general equilibrium under an assumption of certainty. Thus, we had to start our work almost from scratch. One of the first initiatives was to bring together in Geneva, in June of 1973, all the academics in Europe already involved in risk and insurance economics. We found eight from five different countries who never had met before. This seminar chaired by Raymond Barre, the first president of The Geneva Association, was the first of an annual series that became known as the seminar of "The European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists." Since then more than 100 economists from most European countries as well as participants from two other continents and in particular from the United States have taken part in this seminar.

This dissertation includes two chapters. In Chapter 1, "Information Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital Revisited: Evidence from the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I revisit the relationship between information risk and the cost of equity capital in the U.S. property-casualty (P-C) insurance industry. Eckles, Halek and Zhang (2014) find that information risk has no effect on the cost of equity using a sample of U.S. P-C insurers. Following their approach, we decompose information risk into innate and discretionary components. I find that innate information risk affects the cost of equity capital through two opposing channels. On the one hand, innate information risk directly increases an insurer's cost of equity capital by increasing investors' assessment of the riskiness of the insurer's future cash flows. On the other hand, innate information risk indirectly decreases the insurer's cost of equity capital by changing its production so that the assessed riskiness of the firm's future cash flows are reduced. This (negative) indirect effect depends on factors that influence the insurer's underwriting decisions. My empirical results provide supporting evidence for a significant, positive direct effect of innate information risk, while the magnitude of the (negative) indirect effect increases with the insurer's proportion of long-tail business and decreases with its affiliated reinsurance usage. As to the impact of discretionary information risk, my results are mixed. I also find that, on average, the overall effect of information risk on the cost of equity capital for property-casualty insurers is significant and negative. In Chapter 2, "Coordination of Capital, Earnings, and Taxes in the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I investigate how property-casualty (P-C) insurers manage discretionary tools to achieve regulatory capital, earnings, and tax planning goals. I examine one accrual tool, loss reserve errors, together with two real transaction tools: realized capital gains (losses) from investment sales, and capital contributions. I find that when P-C insurers have lower pre-managed capital levels, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors, recognize more realized capital gains and receive more capital contributions. When P-C insurers have lower pre-managed earnings, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors. When P-C insurers have higher marginal tax rates, managers will report income-decreasing loss reserve errors and recognize more realized capital losses. Moreover, I analyze the effect of ownership structures on the degree of managerial discretion for various reporting goals. My analysis includes three different types of ownership structures: public, private stock and mutual firms. I find that, through the use of capital contributions, public firms are more aggressive in capital management, while mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management than private stock firms. In terms of using the other two tools, compared to private stock firms, public firms do not manage capital less aggressively; they do not manage earnings more aggressively; they do not manage taxes less aggressively. Compared to private stock firms, mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management; they are more aggressive in earnings management; they are less aggressive in tax management.

During the last decade, the financial industry has faced several financial crises. Insurance supervisors have reacted by revising the existing regulatory frameworks as well as developing and implementing new solvency models. The economic research of the challenges to the insurance industry arising from these new regulatory systems is therefore an important and contemporary task. This doctoral thesis, which comprises four research papers, seeks to gain new insights into the field of regulation and the solvency assessment of insurance companies. The first paper "The Impact of Private Equity on a Life Insurer's Capital Charges under Solvency II and the Swiss Solvency Test" is an empirical analysis of the performance of the asset class private equity regarding both its risk-return profile and its impact on an insurer's capital requirements under the Solvency II framework of the European Union as well as Switzerland's Solvency Test. We review the standard market risk models and also propose an approach for an internal model. We show that although the risk-return profile of private equity suggests a solid performance in relation to various other asset classes, the standard approaches of Solvency II and the Swiss Solvency Test overly penalize the asset class in terms of capital requirements. The following two research papers pertain to the area of solvency assessment for insurance groups. The paper "Solvency Assessment for Insurance Groups in the United States and Europe - a Comparison of Regulatory Frameworks" is an overview and comparison of three innovative group solvency frameworks: the National Association of Insurance Commissioners approach of the United States, the group structure model of Switzerland, and the Solvency II proposal on group solvency assessment. This comparison is based on the recently established criteria for a thorough group solvency approach of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors' Issues Paper.

A timeless classic of economic theory that remains fascinating and pertinent today, this is Frank Knight's famous explanation of why perfect competition cannot eliminate profits, the important differences between "risk" and "uncertainty," and the vital role of the entrepreneur in profitmaking. Based on Knight's PhD dissertation, this 1921 work, balancing theory with fact to come to stunning insights, is a distinct pleasure to read. FRANK H. KNIGHT (1885-1972) is considered by some the greatest American scholar of economics of the 20th century. An economics professor at the University of Chicago from 1927 until 1955, he was one of the founders of the Chicago school of economics, which influenced Milton Friedman and George Stigler.