This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature about the quality of accounting information by investigating its interaction with institutional factors (i.e., their external environment) in which firms operate, such as industry and stock exchange. The research topics of this dissertation include the motivation of earnings management (chapter 2), the consequence of accounting frauds on the failure rate of IPO firms (chapter 3) and the effectiveness of actions taken by standard setters to improve the quality of accounting information (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 focuses on firms’ industry environment and investigates whether industry valuation impacts management's decision to manage earnings. Chapter 3 has been devoted to examine the consequence of large scale earnings management or accounting scandals on the firm's external environment. Chapter 4 examines whether the uniform adoption of IFRS by EU countries in 2005 improves the quality of accounting information by investigating the changes in the quality of analyst forecasts.

This dissertation is comprised of two empirical essays that examine how different economic forces impact the collection and processing of information. The first essay is motivated by a disclosure theory that suggests a negative impact of disclosure regulation on managers' information acquisition. When the regulator requires a disclosure of unfavorable information, firm managers might reduce information collection to avoid the mandatory disclosure (e. g. , Matthews and Postlewaite 1985; Shavell 1994; Polinsky and Shavell 2010). This theory lacks empirical evidence due to the difficulty in measuring managers' information collection behaviors. I overcome this challenge by investigating a 2007 regulation change that requires pharmaceutical firms to disclose newly found safety problems on their product labels. Using a difference-in-difference research design, I find that firms collect less new safety information in the post-regulation period. My study highlights one unintended negative consequence of disclosure regulation: mandatory disclosure might reduce managers' information production. The second essay is joint work with Zachary Kaplan and Xiumn Martin. We examine whether firm managers selectively convey information to Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, to influence the generating process of the EPS consensus. We find that short-horizon optimistic forecasts are more likely to be removed from the I/B/E/S consensus calculation, after controlling for removal policies that I/B/E/S developed. This higher likelihood of removing optimistic forecasts is more pronounced when (i) the removals allows managers to meet or beat the I/B/E/S consensus, (ii) when managers have greater ability to influence I/B/E/S, and (iii) when costs of alternative options to achieve the meet-or-beat objective are higher. We also find that discretionary removals improve consensus accuracy, suggesting that I/B/E/S benefits from accepting the influence of firm managers. Collectively, our findings challenge the conventional view that I/B/E/S mechanically aggregates EPS forecasts from Wall Street analysts, and also yield insights into I/B/E/S's information production process.

A thorough retrospective guide to financial accounting changes related to Sarbanes - Oxley and corresponding legislation.

This volume, dedicated to John W. Kensinger, explores a variety of topics in financial economics, including firm growth, investment risks, and the profitability of the banking industry. With its global perspective, Essays in Financial Economics is a valuable addition to the bookshelf of any researcher in finance.

Philip Brown is one of the most admired and respected accounting academics alive today. He was a pioneer in capital markets research in accounting, and his 1968 article, co-authored with Ray Ball, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers," arguably had a greater impact on the course of accounting research, directly and indirectly, than any other article during the second half of the twentieth century. Since that time, his innovative research has focused on issues that bridge accounting and finance, including the relationships between net profit reports and the stock market, the long-run performance of acquiring firms, statutory sanctions and voluntary corporate disclosure, and the politics and future of national accounting standards to name a few. This volume brings together the greatest hits of Brown's career, including several articles that were published in out-of-the-way places, for easier use by students and researchers in the field. With a foreword written by Stephen A. Zeff, and an introduction that discusses the evolution of Brown's research interests and explains the context for each of the essays included in the volume, this book offers the reader a unique look inside this remarkable 50-year career.

Philip Brown is one of the most admired and respected accounting academics alive today. He was a pioneer in capital markets research in accounting, and his 1968 article, co-authored with Ray Ball, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers," arguably had a greater impact on the course of accounting research, directly and indirectly, than any other article during the second half of the twentieth century. Since that time, his innovative research has focused on issues that bridge accounting and finance, including the relationships between net profit reports and the stock market, the long-run performance of acquiring firms, statutory sanctions and voluntary corporate disclosure, and the politics and future of national accounting standards to name a few. This volume brings together the greatest hits of Brown’s career, including several articles that were published in out-of-the-way places, for easier use by students and researchers in the field. With a foreword written by Stephen A. Zeff, and an introduction that discusses the evolution of Brown’s research interests and explains the context for each of the essays included in the volume, this book offers the reader a unique look inside this remarkable 50-year career.