Biological evolution is a fact—but the many conflicting theories of evolution remain controversial even today. When Adaptation and Natural Selection was first published in 1966, it struck a powerful blow against those who argued for the concept of group selection—the idea that evolution acts to select entire species rather than individuals. Williams’s famous work in favor of simple Darwinism over group selection has become a classic of science literature, valued for its thorough and convincing argument and its relevance to many fields outside of biology. Now with a new foreword by Richard Dawkins, Adaptation and Natural Selection is an essential text for understanding the nature of scientific debate.

Since the publication of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games" and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice. The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.

This clearly written, accurate, and well-illustrated introduction to biology seamlessly integrates the theme of evolution while offering expanded, up-to-date coverage of genetic engineering, the immune response, embryological development, and ecological concerns.

These proceedings are from a conference held at the Centre for Regional Science (CERUM) at Umea Umeâ University, Sweden, 17-18 June 2001. Unlike Un1ike many conference proceedings, this volume contains only on1y invited invited contribu contribu tions tions on specified topics so as to make the book coherent and self-contained. The authors and editors hope that this coherence will make the volume use fu1 fuI also as a text for courses in industrial organisation. To this end two chap ters on the history of oligopoly theory, from the beginnings with Cournot 1838, to the present day, and one chapter on modem methods for analysing iterated discrete time maps, have been inserted at the beginning ofthe book. Unlike Un1ike most current literature on games and oligopoly, this book is not focused on the usual topics of game theory: optimal strategies, dominance, and equilibrium. Rather it is the evolutionary dynamics, often of a complex type, inc1uding deterministic chaos, which are in focus. The contributions, after the historical and the methodological introductions, represent various segments of the research frontier in this area, though pains have been taken to tie some of the models to a number of most promising contributions from the frugal period 1929-1941, which have suffered from unjust neglect in the following industrial organisation literature.