Admiral Dönitz’ essay on the Conduct of the War at Sea is published... for several reasons. It has historical significance as a review of the German Navy’s participation in World War II. Also, from the standpoint of naval science, the opinions of an enemy naval officer of Dönitz’ caliber merit study and consideration. Still more important is the forceful presentation of Hitler’s fatal error in disregarding or underestimating the necessity of sea power as a prerequisite to a major political power engaging successfully in war of any magnitude - or, by the same token, defending successfully its own political and economic boundaries and rights. In order to assist in the analysis of the essay, this publication includes a biographical sketch of the author, introductory remarks concerning the essay’s background and contents and a list of subjects in the form of a table of contents Doenitz was interrogated in order to amplify certain portions and theories of the essay, and his interrogation is also published herewith . His reaction to such interrogation and to analyses made of the essay is set forth in the Introduction.

In July 1943 Benito Mussolini, Italy's warlord and the father of fascism fell from power in a hastily arranged plot, the details of which even today remain controversial. A cabal of generals took the nation's reins and bungled their way toward an accommodation with the Allies. When General Eisenhower announced an armistice with Italy on the evening of 8 September he believed he had struck a deal that included Italian military cooperation against the Germans. In fact, the generals had promised more than they could deliver and Germany's terrible, swift reprisal shattered Italy's confused air force and army. The armistice likewise caught the navy by surprise, with its battleships raising steam to attack the Allied fleet landing at Salerno. Nonetheless, the Regia Marina obeyed its government's orders and honored the pact the generals had negotiated. Rather than evaporating like Italy's other services, however, it proceeded to fight a three-week campaign against Germany, without Allied support, and in the process retained complete control of its ships, regardless of the ports necessity forced them to seek refuge in. This is the story of the Regia Marina and the Italian armistice of September 1943. It is a deeply-researched and highly readable exploration of this confusing and fascinating corner of history. It refutes the conventional notion that Italy's fleet abjectly surrendered to Allied power. It shows how the navy paved Italy's path from enemy to co-belligerent with the blood and unconquered spirit of its men. Despite German and Allied intentions to secure Italy's fleet for their own uses, it remained Italian to the end: a dark navy - not victorious, but undefeated. Vincent P. O'Hara and Enrico Cernuschi have collaborated for publications including "Warship, World War II Magazine, World War II Quarterly, " and the new "Seaforth Naval Review." Mr. O'Hara has written several books including "Struggle for the Middle Sea: the Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean 1939-1945" (Annapolis, 2009). Mr. Cernuschi is a regular contributor to Rivista Marittima and Storia Militare. He has published a dozen books including "Le navi da guerra italiane 1940-1945" (Parma, 2003) and "Domenico Cavagnari: Storia di un Ammiraglio" (Rome, 2001) About DARK NAVY The huge tragedy suffered by the Italian navy and nation has been reduced, until today, to a brief mention in the very few books available abroad about the Regia Marina's war between 1940 and 1945. It is thus quite important that a new essay directed toward English speaking readers is dedicated, at last, to these events, allowing them to sortie beyond the confines of Italian naval historiography--which has long debated these themes--and beyond the scanty circulation abroad of the Italian language.--Erminio Bagnasco, editor of STORIA Militare DARK NAVY is a masterful account of the Regia Marina's role in the Armistice of September 1943. The authors are to be commended for overturning the propagandist mythology which has often marred English-language histories of this difficult period in Italian history. A riveting story.--John Jordan, editor of WARSHIP DARK NAVY gives an excellent overview of the naval, air, and land impact on the Italian military at the time of the 8 September 1943 Armistice. It clearly shows the hesitancy of various leaders, on both sides, as they grappled with "what to do?" in this radically changed wartime environment and gives solid detail on the actions that resulted.--Jack Greene, author (with Alessandro Massigiani) of NAVAL WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1940-1943.

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.

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At the beginning of World War II, Prince Junio Valerio Borghese, dashing Italian nobleman, assembled the famous Decima MAS naval unit-the first modern naval commando squad. Borghese's "frogmen" were trained to fight undercover and underwater with small submarines and assault boats armed with a variety of destructive torpedoes. The covert tactics he and the Decima MAS developed, including the use of midget submarines, secret nighttime operations, and small teams armed with explosives, have become a standard for special forces around the world to this very day.After the Italian capitulation in 1943, Borghese determinedly fought on as a Fascist commando leader. After the war, he became a man of mystery, variously said to be involved with several right-wing conspiracies, abortive coups, and clandestine activity. The Prince's death in 1974 was every bit as mysterious as his life.Greene and Massignani have drawn upon official archives as well as information from Allied and Axis veterans in an unprecedented attempt to separate fact from fantasy in this detailed examination of Borghese, the Decima MAS, and the Italian naval special forces.

The author argues that it is the progressivism born of irreligious humanism that is the main source of the troubles of the 20th century and finds support for his thesis in the work of various contemporary thinkers as well as in his own experience. Contains the author's personal reminiscences of many of his friends, including Frieda Lawrence, John Middleton Murry, R.H. Tawney, A.J. Cook and others.