Foundational theories of epistemic justice, such as Miranda Fricker's, have cited literary narratives to support their case. But why have those narratives in particular provided the resource that was needed? And is cultural production always supportive of epistemic justice? This essay collection, written by experts in literary, philosophical, and cultural studies working in conversation with each other across a range of global contexts, expands the emerging field of epistemic injustice studies. The essays analyze the complex relationship between narrative, aesthetics, and epistemic (in)justice, referencing texts, film, and other forms of cultural production. The authors present, without seeking to synthesize, perspectives on how justice and injustice are narratively and aesthetically produced. This volume by no means wants to say the last word on epistemic justice and creative agency. The intention is to open out a productive new field of study, at a time when understanding the workings of injustice and possibilities for justice seems an ever more urgent project.

Foundational theories of epistemic justice, such as Miranda Fricker's, have cited literary narratives to support their case. But why have those narratives in particular provided the resource that was needed? And is cultural production always supportive of epistemic justice? This essay collection, written by experts in literary, philosophical, and cultural studies working in conversation with each other across a range of global contexts, expands the emerging field of epistemic injustice studies. The essays analyze the complex relationship between narrative, aesthetics, and epistemic (in)justice, referencing texts, film, and other forms of cultural production. The authors present, without seeking to synthesize, perspectives on how justice and injustice are narratively and aesthetically produced. This volume by no means wants to say the last word on epistemic justice and creative agency. The intention is to open out a productive new field of study, at a time when understanding the workings of injustice and possibilities for justice seems an ever more urgent project.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

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This outstanding reference source to epistemic injustice is the first collection of its kind. Over thirty chapters address topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, gender and race.

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

I advance a new theory of epistemic injustice, with important implications for pursuing epistemic justice. This project develops a positive account of epistemic justice, broadens the scope of the phenomenon, and motivates new interventions. This dissertations works towards a better understanding of what it means to be an epistemic subject and to be treated as such.I argue that epistemic injustice can be understood through a lens of participation in inquiry, rather than using the received view that focuses on testimony. On my account, victims are marginalized when disrespected and devalued as potential participants in inquiry due to prejudice. This account broadens the domain of epistemic injustice, incorporating different instances of epistemic exclusion that do not involve testimony. This participatory account can better explain the core features of epistemic injustice and identifies mechanisms in subtypes of epistemic injustice. Preventing and remedying epistemic injustice requires creating inclusive communities that respect and foster participation in inquiry. I argue that the virtuous elements of inclusion are embodied in groups rather than individuals, and can successfully address the wrong of epistemic injustice. Successfully fostering inclusion will require an intersectional approach in order to address varied forms of epistemic injustice.My dissertation is a collection of five inter-related articles expanding the notion of epistemic injustice. In the first chapter, the article "What's unjust about testimonial injustice?" explores underlying notions of "justice" within the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. I argue that different philosophers rely upon different notions of justice (specifically David Coady and Miranda Fricker). In contrast to both of their views, I argue that epistemic injustice should be understood as a form of oppression. Next, I argue that there are at least two different ways to disrespect victims of epistemic injustice: by denying them recognition respect (their epistemic standing) or appraisal respect (their credibility). The article "Credibility and Recognition: Two Failures of Respect in Epistemic Injustice" makes up the second chapter. Chapter three, "Knowledge and Participation: Giving a Participatory Account of Epistemic Injustice" argues that epistemic subjects are wronged when de-valued as potential participants (by denying access, recognition, or appraisal).This participatory framework is better able to analyze the category of epistemic injustice compared to other approaches. I propose cultivating the virtue of inclusion (as a virtue of social groups) in the next chapter: "Inclusion: Addressing Epistemic Injustice with a Group Virtue". Inclusion (rather than open-mindedness, testimonial injustice, or trust) is the virtue that is best able to prevent and remedy instances of epistemic injustice. Using a case study of patients with fibromyalgia, I show that different types of epistemic injustice impact and reinforce one another. Those who experience epistemic injustice encounter it while also experiencing other overlapping oppressions. As a result, I argue we must pursue intersectional epistemic justice. The fifth and final chapter addresses this topic, in: "The Pain of Being Overlooked: A Case Study on Fibromyalgia and Intersectional Epistemic Justice".The existing literature on epistemic injustice has been overly narrow in focus, missing significant instances of epistemic wrongs. My project can help both ethicists and epistemologists formulate solutions to epistemic oppression by providing a more fully developed account of epistemic ideals. Methodologically, I draw from varied approaches including virtue ethics, social epistemology, feminist philosophy, and social psychology. This approach has direct implications not only for ethics research but also for teaching pedagogy and provides new avenues for preventing the epistemic marginalization of vulnerable individuals.