The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.

This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic" that was published in Games

Does game theory - the mathematical theory of strategic interaction - provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory - the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory - is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. De Bruin proves new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and he explores in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. He argues that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, De Bruin argues, has been rather successful in achieving this aim.

Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.

Epistemic logic and, more generally, logics of knowledge and belief, originated with philosophers such as Jaakko Hintikka and David Lewis in the early 1960s. Since then, such logics have played a significant role not only in philosophy, but also in computer science, artificial intelligence, and economics. This handbook reports significant progress in a field that, while more mature, continues to be very active. This book should make it easier for new researchers to enter the field, and give experts a chance to appreciate work in related areas. The book starts with a gentle introduction to the logics of knowledge and belief; it gives an overview of the area and the material covered in the book. The following eleven chapters, each written by a leading researcher (or researchers), cover the topics of only knowing, awareness, knowledge and probability, knowledge and time, the dynamics of knowledge and of belief, model checking, game theory, agency, knowledge and ability, and security protocols. The chapters have been written so that they can be read independently and in any order. Each chapter ends with a section of notes that provides some historical background, including references, and a detailed bibliography.

A comprehensive examination of the interfaces of logic, computer science, and game theory, drawing on twenty years of research on logic and games. This book draws on ideas from philosophical logic, computational logic, multi-agent systems, and game theory to offer a comprehensive account of logic and games viewed in two complementary ways. It examines the logic of games: the development of sophisticated modern dynamic logics that model information flow, communication, and interactive structures in games. It also examines logic as games: the idea that logical activities of reasoning and many related tasks can be viewed in the form of games. In doing so, the book takes up the “intelligent interaction” of agents engaging in competitive or cooperative activities and examines the patterns of strategic behavior that arise. It develops modern logical systems that can analyze information-driven changes in players' knowledge and beliefs, and introduces the “Theory of Play” that emerges from the combination of logic and game theory. This results in a new view of logic itself as an interactive rational activity based on reasoning, perception, and communication that has particular relevance for games. Logic in Games, based on a course taught by the author at Stanford University, the University of Amsterdam, and elsewhere, can be used in advanced seminars and as a resource for researchers.

A broad introduction to the subject; many exercises with full solutions are provided.