This paper draws on a unique data set on the nontraditional systemic liquidity easing measures recently undertaken by many emerging market economies. It offers an empirical analysis of the key determinants affecting the decision to undertake these measures over the period September 2008-March 2009. The paper finds that economy size, access to international credit markets, CDS spreads, currency depreciation, and current account balances are among the key factors influencing the adoption of these measures. It provides a rationale for the differences in central bank policy responses, which reflect differences in economic structures rather than conflicting views on fundamental principles. The paper also provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of these measures and points out that despite their positive impacts, they have not fully shielded the real economy from the recent financial meltdown.

This paper draws on a unique data set on the nontraditional systemic liquidity easing measures recently undertaken by many emerging market economies. It offers an empirical analysis of the key determinants affecting the decision to undertake these measures over the period September 2008-March 2009. The paper finds that economy size, access to international credit markets, CDS spreads, currency depreciation, and current account balances are among the key factors influencing the adoption of these measures. It provides a rationale for the differences in central bank policy responses, which reflect differences in economic structures rather than conflicting views on fundamental principles. The paper also provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of these measures and points out that despite their positive impacts, they have not fully shielded the real economy from the recent financial meltdown.

This paper draws on a unique data set on the nontraditional systemic liquidity easing measures recently undertaken by many emerging market economies. It offers an empirical analysis of the key determinants affecting the decision to undertake these measures over the period September 2008-March 2009. The paper finds that economy size, access to international credit markets, CDS spreads, currency depreciation, and current account balances are among the key factors influencing the adoption of these measures. It provides a rationale for the differences in central bank policy responses, which reflect differences in economic structures rather than conflicting views on fundamental principles. The paper also provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of these measures and points out that despite their positive impacts, they have not fully shielded the real economy from the recent financial meltdown.

Unconventional central bank measures are playing a key policy role for many advanced economies in the 2007-09 global crisis. Are they playing a similar role for emerging economies? Emerging economies have widely used unconventional foreign exchange and domestic short-term liquidity easing measures. Their use of credit easing and quantitative easing measures has been much more limited. Thus, unconventional measures are much less important for emerging economies compared to advanced economies in achieving broader macroeconomic objectives. The difference can be attributed to the relatively limited financial stress in emerging economies, their external vulnerabilities and their limited scope for quasifiscal activities.

The interventions of crisis management during the 2007 to 2011 financial crisis were not simply responses to a set of given developments in markets, banking or neo-liberal capitalism. Nor can those interventions be adequately explained as the actions of sovereign state officials and institutions. Instead, Langley argues, processes of crisis governance are shown to have established six principal technical problems to be acted upon: liquidity, toxicity, solvency, risk, regulation, and debt and that the governance of these technical problems, is shown to have been strategically assembled in order to secure the continuation of a particular, financialized way of life that depends upon global financial circulations. Contributing to interdisciplinary debates in cultural economy and the social studies of finance, and grounded in extensive empirical research, this book offers an innovative analysis of how the contemporary global financial crisis was governed. Through an exploration of the interventions made by central banks, treasuries, and regulatory authorities in the Anglo-American heartland of the crisis between 2007 and 2011, experimental and strategic apparatuses of crisis governance are shown to have emerged. These discrete apparatuses established the six technical problems to be acted upon, but also shared certain proclivities and preferences. Crisis governance assembled discourses and devices of economy in relation with sovereign monetary, fiscal, and regulatory techniques, and elicited an affective atmosphere of confidence. It also sought to secure the financialized way of life which turns on the opportunities ostensibly afforded by uncertain financial circulations, and gave rise to post-crisis technical fixes designed to advance the resilience of banking and the macro-prudential regulation of financial stability. Thus, the consensus that prevails across economics, political economy, and beyond - wherein sovereign state institutions are cast as coming to the rescue of the markets, banking, or neo-liberal capitalism - conceals a great deal more than it reveals about the governance of the global financial crisis.

We study whether capital flows affect the degree of credit crunch faced by a country's manufacturing firms during the 2007-09 crisis. Examining 3823 firms in 24 emerging countries, we find that the decline in stock prices was more severe for firms that are intrinsically more dependent on external finance for working capital. The volume of capital flows has no significant effect on the severity of the credit crunch. However, the composition of capital flows matters: pre-crisis exposure to non-FDI capital inflows worsens the credit crunch, while exposure to FDI alleviates the liquidity constraint. Similar results also hold surrounding the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy