The fundamental premise of this study is that where Constitutions, such as that of India and Pakistan, articulate legal norms which limit the scope of the executive power to derogate from individual rights during states of emergency, there must likewise exist an effective control mechanism to ensure that the Executive acts within the scope of that power. Viewed from this perspective, the judicial power to interpret the Constitution imposes upon the Court the constitutional duty to provide adequate safeguards against the abuse of state power affecting individual rights. This power remains available notwithstanding the presumed or purported ouster of judicial review. The concept of judicial review as a source of control is examined in the light of the experience of Pakistan and India during periods of constitutional emergency. The divergent approaches of the Courts in these countries, in litigation concerning emergency powers and individual rights, are explained in terms of divergent views that these Courts have adopted with respect to the nature of judicial review.

What role does, and should, legal, political, and constitutional norms play in constraining emergency powers, in Asia and beyond.

This book makes a significant contribution to the understanding of issues of comparative constitutionalism in emergent politics. Recurrent states of emergency in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh provide the background for a comparative examination of constitutional emergency powers, individual rights, and judicial review. This work examines the extent to which the Court in these countries has performed its expected role, identifies problems in approaches to interpretation which have been adopted, and suggests alternatives to constitutional interpretation and judicial review. The alternatives explored are drawn from contemporary western jurisprudence, including those of Ronald Dworkin and writers of the Critical Legal Studies tradition. The juxtaposition of western jurisprudential development to issues of constitutionalism in the countries under survey is a bold attempt to seek some common ground in conceptualizing rights and techniques of juristic interpretation in western and eastern legal cultures. The theoretical framework of the study is well-perceived, the arguments convincing. This carefully researched work makes a valuable and scholarly contribution to the study of comparative constitutional law and jurisprudence.

This book presents a comprehensive legal and constitutional study of emergency powers from a comparative common law perspective. It is one of very few comparative studies on three jurisdictions and arguably the first one to explore in detail various emergency powers, statutory and common law, constitutional and statutory law, martial law and military acting-in-aid of civil authority, wartime and peacetime invocations, and several related and vital themes like judicial review of emergency powers (existence, scope and degree). The three jurisdictions compared here are: the pure implied common law model (employed by the UK), implied constitutional model (employed by the USA) and the explicit constitutional model (employed by India). The book’s content has important implications, as these three jurisdictions collectively cover the largest population within the common law world, and also provide maximum representative diversity. The book covers the various positions on external emergencies as opposed to internal emergencies, economic/financial emergencies, and emergent inroads being made into state autonomy by the central or federal governments, through use of powers like Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. By providing a detailed examination of the law and practice of emergency powers, the book shares a wealth of valuable insights. Specific sub-chapters address questions like – what is the true meaning of ‘martial law’; who can invoke ‘martial law’; when can it be invoked and suspended; what happens when the military is called in to aid civilian authorities; can martial law be deemed to exist or coexist when this happens; what are the limits on state powers when an economic emergency is declared; and, above all, can, and if so, when and how should courts judicially review emergency powers? These and several other questions are asked and answered in this study. Though several checks and constraints have been devised regarding the scope and extent of ‘emergency powers,’ these powers are still prone to misuse, as all vast powers are. A study of the legal propositions on this subject, especially from a comparative perspective, is valuable for any body politic that aspires to practice democracy, while also allowing constitutionally controlled aberrations to protect that democracy.

Oxford Handbooks of Political Science are the essential guide to the state of political science today. With engaging contributions from 51 major international scholars, the Oxford Handbook of Political Theory provides the key point of reference for anyone working in political theory and beyond.

Comparative constitutional law is a field of increasing importance around the world, but much of the literature is focused on Europe, North America, and English-speaking jurisdictions. The importance of Asia for the broader field is demonstrated here i

This book critically examines the evolving global trend of judicial activism with particular reference to Bangladesh. It constructs judicial activism as a golden-mean adjudicative technology, standing between excessive judicial assertion and unacceptable judicial passivity that may leave injustices un-redressed. It argues that judicial balancing between over-activism and meek administration of justice should essentially be predicated upon domestic conditions, and the needs and fundamental public values of the judges’ respective society. Providing cross-jurisdictional empirical evidence, the study demonstrates that judicial activism, steered towards improving justice and grounded in one’s societal specificities, can be exercised in a morally and legally legitimate form and without rupturing the balance of powers among the state organs. This study has sought to displace the myth of judicial activism as constitutional transgression by “unelected” judges, arguing that judicial activism is quite different from excessivism. It is argued and shown that a particular judge or judiciary turns out to be activist when other public functionaries avoid or breach their constitutional responsibilities and thus generate injustice and inequality. The study treats judicial activism as the conscientious exposition of constitutional norms and enforcement of public duties of those in positions of power. The study assesses whether Bangladeshi judges have been striking the correct balance between over-activism and injudicious passivity. Broadly, the present book reveals judicial under-activism in Bangladesh and offers insights into causes for this. It is argued that the existing milieu of socio-political injustices and over-balance of constitutional powers in Bangladesh calls for increased judicial intervention and guidance, of course in a balanced and pragmatic manner, which is critical for good governance and social justice. “Writing about judicial activism easily gets shackled by fussy and pedestrian debates about what judges may or may not do as unelected agents of governance. The book . . . goes much beyond such reductionist pedestrianisation of law, for it courageously lifts the debate into the skies of global legal realism. The analysis perceptively addresses bottlenecks of justice, identifying shackles and mental blocks in our own minds against activising concerns for justice for the common citizen.” —Prof Werner Menski (Foreword)