The way we make sense of emotional situations has long been considered a foundation for the construction of our emotional experiences. Sometimes emotional meanings become distorted and so do our emotional experiences become disturbed. In the last decades, an embodied construction of emotional meanings has emerged. In this book, the embodied simulation framework is introduced for distorted emotional and motivational appraisals such as irrational beliefs, focusing on hyper-reactive emotional and motivational neural embodied simulations as core processes of cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. By embodying distorted emotional cognition we can extend the traditional views of the development of distorted emotional appraisals beyond learning from stress-sensitization process. Conclusions for the conceptualization of distorted emotional appraisals and treatment implications are discussed. Distorted emotional cognitions such as rigid thinking (I should succeed), awfulizing (It’s awful) and low frustration tolerance (I can’t stand it) are both vulnerabilities to emotional disorders and targets of psychotherapy. In this book, I argue that distorted emotional cognitions which act as proximal vulnerability to emotional disorders are embodied in hyper-reactive neural states involved in dysregulated emotions. Traditionally, excessive negative knowledge has been considered the basis of the cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. I suggest that the differences in the affective embodiments of distorted cognition confer its vulnerability status, rather than the differences in dysfunctional knowledge. I propose that negative knowledge and stress-induced brain changes conflate each other in building cognitive vulnerability to disturbed emotion. This model of distorted emotional cognition suggests new integration of learning and medication interventions in psychotherapy. This book is an important contribution to the literature given that a new model for the conceptualization of cognitive vulnerability is presented which extends the way we integrate biological, behavioral, and memory interventions in cognitive restructuring. This work is part of a larger project on embodied clinical cognition.

The way we make sense of emotional situations has long been considered a foundation for the construction of our emotional experiences. Sometimes emotional meanings become distorted and so do our emotional experiences become disturbed. In the last decades, an embodied construction of emotional meanings has emerged. In this book, the embodied simulation framework is introduced for distorted emotional and motivational appraisals such as irrational beliefs, focusing on hyper-reactive emotional and motivational neural embodied simulations as core processes of cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. By embodying distorted emotional cognition we can extend the traditional views of the development of distorted emotional appraisals beyond learning from stress-sensitization process. Conclusions for the conceptualization of distorted emotional appraisals and treatment implications are discussed. Distorted emotional cognitions such as rigid thinking (I should succeed), awfulizing (It’s awful) and low frustration tolerance (I can’t stand it) are both vulnerabilities to emotional disorders and targets of psychotherapy. In this book, I argue that distorted emotional cognitions which act as proximal vulnerability to emotional disorders are embodied in hyper-reactive neural states involved in dysregulated emotions. Traditionally, excessive negative knowledge has been considered the basis of the cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. I suggest that the differences in the affective embodiments of distorted cognition confer its vulnerability status, rather than the differences in dysfunctional knowledge. I propose that negative knowledge and stress-induced brain changes conflate each other in building cognitive vulnerability to disturbed emotion. This model of distorted emotional cognition suggests new integration of learning and medication interventions in psychotherapy. This book is an important contribution to the literature given that a new model for the conceptualization of cognitive vulnerability is presented which extends the way we integrate biological, behavioral, and memory interventions in cognitive restructuring. This work is part of a larger project on embodied clinical cognition. .

Emotional disorders such as anxiety, depression, and dysfunctional patterns of eating are clearly among the most devastating and prevalent confronting practitioners, and they have received much attention from researchers--in personality, social, cognitive, and developmental psychology, as well as in clinical psychology and psychiatry. A major recent focus has been cognitive vulnerability, which seems to set the stage for recurrences of symptoms and episodes. In the last five years there has been a rapid proliferation of studies. In this book, leading experts present the first broad synthesis of what we have now learned about the nature, of cognitive factors that seem to play a crucial role in creating and maintaining vulnerability across the spectrum of emotional disorders. An introductory chapter considers theory and research design and methodology and constructs a general conceptual framework for understanding and studying the relationships between developmental and cognitive variables and later risk, and the difference between distal cognitive antecedents of disorders (e.g. depressive inferential styles, dysfunctional attitudes) and proximal ones (e.g. schema activation or inferences). Subsequent chapters are organized into three sections, on mood, anxiety, and eating disorders. Each section ends with an integrative overview chapter that offers both incisive commentary and insightful suggestions for further systematic research. A rich resource for all those professionally concerned with these problems, Cognitive Vulnerability to Emotional Disorders advances both clinical science and clinical practice.

Recent years have witnessed a revival of research in the interplay between cognition and emotion. The reasons for this renaissance are many and varied. In the first place, emotion theorists have come to recognize the pivotal role of cognitive factors in virtually all aspects of the emotion process, and to rely on basic cognitive factors and insight in creating new models of affective space. Also, the successful application of cognitive therapies to affective disorders has prompted clinical psychologists to work towards a clearer understanding of the connections between cognitive processes and emotional problems. And whereas the cognitive revolutionaries of the 1960s regarded emotions with suspicion, viewing them as nagging sources of "hot" noise in an otherwise cool, rational, and computer-like system of information processing, cognitive researchers of the 1990s regard emotions with respect, owing to their potent and predictable effects on tasks as diverse as object perception, episodic recall, and risk assessment. These intersecting lines of interest have made cognition and emotion one of the most active and rapidly developing areas within psychological science. Written in debate format, this book covers developing fields such as social cognition, as well as classic areas such as memory, learning, perception and categorization. The links between emotion and memory, learning, perception, categorization, social judgements, and behavior are addressed. Contributors come from the U.S., Canada, Australia, and France.