Following on from the work on the safety of nuclear facility published in 1996, which needed to be updated and extended in scope, IRSN has created a new series of educational publications entitled "Elements of nuclear safety, radiological protection and security". The series takes up the general objective of tackling all aspects of risk management in the nuclear field, in terms of protecting human health, society and the environment. The first publication in this series, covering nuclear security and non-proliferation, describes the measures implemented in France and at international level to prevent terrorism and malicious acts and, if necessary, mitigate the consequences of any such act. It deals with the security of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and the transport of nuclear material, the security of radioactive sources and describes States' undertakings to implement safeguards relative to tracking nuclear material and chemicals to prevent their use for fraudulent purposes. These publications will be of interest to anyone concerned by these issues, especially those who work in the nuclear industry, but it will also answer many questions that members of the public may have regarding these subjects. It indudes information on context and history, the provisions and requirements contained in French regulations and international agreements, as well as details of the roles played by the various entities involved, induding IRSN.

Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, Second Edition is a comprehensive reference covering the cutting-edge technologies used to trace, track and safeguard nuclear material. Sections cover security, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, improvised nuclear devices, and how to prevent nuclear terrorism. International case studies of security at nuclear facilities and illegal nuclear trade activities provide specific examples of the complex issues surrounding the technology and policy for nuclear material protection, control and accountability. New case studies include analyses of nuclear programs of important countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Kazakhstan, among others. This is a thoroughly updated, must-have volume for private and public organizations involved in driving national security, domestic and international policy issues relating to nuclear material security, non-proliferation, and nuclear transparency. - Covers the continuing efforts to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals - Highlights the challenges of verifying nuclear weapons reduction - Summarizes issues from the 2015 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference - Illuminates the evolving status of nonproliferation and safeguards in Iran and DPRK

The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear weapons remain an essential part of the security policies of leading states. This volume assesses contemporary efforts to stem nuclear proliferation with a view to recommending better non-proliferation tools and strategies. It is of interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, and international security in general.

At the request of Congress, this report presents findings and recommendations related to governance of the U.S. government's monitoring, detection, and verification (MDV) enterprise and offers findings and recommendations related to technical MDV capabilities and research, development, test, and evaluation efforts, focused in particular on the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear test explosions, and arms control.

The papers compiled in this report attempt to determine under what conditions and to what extent cultural factors make a difference in the elaboration and execution of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD) policies. They seek to clarify a concept of security cultures that draws upon the diplomatic, political, strategic, and social elements that go into security policy-making. Culture, as it refers to NACD issues, consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's or society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated, and advanced by political actors and elites. The papers cover a range of states and regions: south-east Asia, China, India, Latin America, and the Middle East. Each examines a range of concrete issues and cases connected with NACD issues, and orientations towards security more generally.