The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck' nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill's incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years.

The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck' nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill's incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years.

The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck' nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill's incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1989.

History of International Relations, Diplomacy and Intelligence, 20 (History of International Relations Library, 31) ABOUT THE BOOK: This book provides the first in-depth examination of the role of science and scientists in the national security policymaking of the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower's New Look containment strategy was predicated on American strength in science and technology, but the relationship between science and the Cold War state was complex and conflicted. Scientists and statesmen constantly negotiated the appropriate balance between the requirements of scientific progress and national security. Ultimately, after the Soviet sputniks, Eisenhower's personal science advisers, James Killian and George Kistiakowsky, supported by the newly-established President's Science Advisory Committee, became ubiquitous as the administration grappled with the consequences of the technological arms race and the advent of the space race. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction Chapter 1: From the Old Consensus to the New: The Impact of Depression and War on Government-Science Relations Chapter 2: Science, Secrecy, and Security: Science Advice in the Early Eisenhower Administration Chapter 3: The Technological Capabilities Panel and the Emergence of Eisenhower's "Scientific-Technological Elite" Chapter 4: The Sputnik Crisis and the Reorganization of Science Advice at the White House Chapter 5: Containing the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex: Eisenhower's Scientists and Post-Sputnik Defense Policy Chapter 6: Eisenhower's Science Advisers and the Early Space Race Chapter 7: The Limitations of Expert Advice: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate Chapter 8: Strengthening American Science: National Security, Science, and Education Conclusion Bibliography Index ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Richard V. Damms, Ph.D. (1993) in History, The Ohio State University, is Associate Professor of History at Mississippi State University. He is the author of The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953-1962 (Longman, 2002) and several articles and essays on the Eisenhower era.