From the beginning of World War II until he left the White House in early 1961, Dwight David Eisenhower played a leadership role on the world stage. This was longer than any American since George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams. His Columbia presidency was part of this period, yet the story has not been told. Scholars have repeated earlier critical contemporary assessments and largely dismissed or ignored that part of his career. Jacobs seeks to answer many of the open-ended questions about Eisenhower's tenure as successor to Nicholas Murray Butler, whom many consider the greatest university president of the century. Jacobs examines previously unused sources to analyze Eisenhower's leadership and accomplishments, his goals and intentions, and whether his presidency at Columbia, generally considered a failure, ever had a chance of succeeding.This insightful, well-written volume covers the years that played such a vital role in Dwight D. Eisenhower's journey to the White House. Jacobs reviews Eisenhower's appointment as chief of staff after his return from Europe after V-E Day, and, concurrently, looks at Columbia's difficulties in its troubled search for a president. He examines the deliberations on both sides before Eisenhower's acceptance of Columbia's presidency, and the circumstances surrounding his arrival and installation. Jacobs covers Eisenhower's subsequent leave of absence and return to duty at the Pentagon as NATO commander and the impact of his extended absence from Columbia. He resigned on the eve of his inauguration as president of the United States. Jacobs recounts the hostility of campus liberal intellectuals who had increasingly resented Eisenhower's presidency and were offended by the New York Times's endorsement of Eisenhower over Adlai E. Stevenson for the 1952 presidential campaign. Jacobs views Eisenhower's years as university president as playing a significant role in preparing him for his White House years.A thorough assessment of Eisenhower's career on Morningside Heights is long overdue. Jacobs' insights on Eisenhower's presidency at Columbia will be of interest to Eisenhower's biographers, college and university administrators, American studies students, and the general public, curious about Eisenhower's public service as a civilian, before he became U. S. president.

In his magisterial bestseller "FDR," Smith provided a fresh, modern look at one of the most indelible figures in American history. Now this peerless biographer returns with a new life of Dwight D. Eisenhower that is as full, rich, and revealing as anything ever written about America's 34th president.

The newest volumes in this distinguished series cover Eisenhower's first term as President of the United States, from January 1953 to January 1956. Meticulously edited and carefully annotated, these memorandums, diary entries, and personal and official letters shed new light on some of the most important topics in recent American history. The newest volumes in this distinguished series cover Eisenhower's first term as President of the United States, from January 1953 to January 1956. Meticulously edited and carefully annotated, these memorandums, diary entries, and personal and official letters shed new light on some of the most important topics in recent American history. Eisenhower won the presidency decisively after offering the American people an alternative to the New Deal and Fair Deal policies that had dominated public life for twenty years. He ended the unpopular Korean War and dealt effectively with crises in Guatemala and Iran. Problems in Egypt, Southeast Asia, and the Formosa Straits, however, proved intractable. Meanwhile, Eisenhower wrestled with the demands of GOP leadership. His political coalition, built at the center, felt constant pressure from the Republican right, particularly from Ohio senator John Bricker, who opposed international commitments that might circumscribe U.S. sovereignty, and Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy, who claimed to find Communist conspiracies in the highest reaches of government In 1955, despite his having suffered a heart attack, the president reluctantly decided to seek another term, hoping thereby to secure his domestic successes and carry forward his work toward a stable, peaceful world order. Although diplomatic troubles in the Middle East and an anti-communist outbreak in Hungary kept him from much personal campaigning in the summer and fall of 1956, he won an impressive mandate in November and began preparing for a second term. The Presidency: The Middle Way makes a new contribution to our understanding of the Eisenhower administration and Ike's role in creating the modern presidency. Taken together, the documents portray Eisenhower as a forceful leader who faced truly vexing domestic and cold war problems and handled them with great skill and a fundamental sense of decency.

Does the public alter American foreign policy choices, or does the government change public opinion to supports its policies? In this detailed study, Douglas Foyle demonstrates that the differing influence of public opinion is mediated in large part through each president's beliefs about the value and significance of public opinion.Using archival collections and public sources, Foyle examines the beliefs of all the post-World War II presidents in addition to the foreign policy decisions of Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Bill Clinton. He finds that some presidents are relatively open to public opinion while others hold beliefs that cause them to ignore the public's view. Several orientations toward public opinion are posited: the delegate (Clinton) favors public input and seeks its support; the executor (Carter) believes public input is desirable, but its support is not necessary; the pragmatist (Eisenhower, Bush) does not seek public input in crafting policy, but sees public support as necessary; and finally, the guardian (Reagan) neither seeks public input nor requires public support. The book examines the public's influence through case studies regarding decisions on: the Formosa Straits crisis; intervention at Dien Bien Phu; the Sputnik launch; the New Look defense strategy; the Panama Canal Treaties; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the Strategic Defense Initiative; the Beirut Marine barracks bombing; German reunification; the Gulf War; intervention in Somalia; and intervention in Bosnia.

The Eisenhower Administration developed and implemented policies in Southeast Asia that contributed directly to the massive American military involvement in Vietnam in the decade after Dwight Eisenhower left office. Working with the most recently declassified government records on U.S. policy in Vietnam in the 1950s, David L. Anderson asserts that the Eisenhower Administration was less successful in Vietnam than the revisionists suggests. Trapped By Success is the first systematic study of the entire eight years of the Eisenhower Administration's efforts to build a nation in South Vietnam in order to protect U.S. global interests. Proclaiming success, where, in fact, failure abounded, the Eisenhower Administration trapped itself and its successors into a commitment to the survival of its own frail creation in Indochina. The book is a chronicle of clandestine plots, bureaucratic fights, cultural and strategic mistakes, and missed opportunities. Anderson examines the politicla environments in Saigon and Washington that contributed to the deepening of American involvement. Contrary to other studies that highlight Eisenhower's restraint in preventing French collapse in Indochina in 1954, Trapped By Success shows how the administration publicly applauded South Veitnam's survival and growing stability, while it was actually producing an almost totally dependent regime that would ultimately consume billions of American dollars and thousands of American lives.

Using M. G. Hermann's Personality Assessment-at-a-Distance (PAD) profiling technique as well as exhaustive archival research and interviews with former advisers, the author develops a leadership style typology. He then compares his model's expectations against the actual policy record, using six foreign policy episodes.