Eighth report of Session 2009-10 : Documents considered by the Committee on 20 January 2010, including the following recommendations for debate, Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2009-2010; CSDP: piracy off the coast of Somalia; Financial managemen

Technologies such as GPS, vital to the financial markets as well as the military, are known to be vulnerable to the effects of space weather or the EMP resultant from a nuclear weapon exploded at altitude. It is also possible to build non-nuclear devices which can disrupt electronic systems, though so far only over a limited area. A severe space weather event is not necessarily seen as a military problem in the first instance, but it would be likely to meet the definition of an "emergency" under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and call for the help of the Armed Forces. The reactive posture described by the Government appears somewhat complacent. The Committee is very concerned that there appears to be no one Government Department identified to take immediate lead responsibility should there be a severe space weather event. The Government must make clear exactly where lead responsibility in relation to EMP disturbances lies both nationally and within the MoD. Defence alone cannot protect against the threat of EMP. It must be a concern of the National Security Council and civil contingency planners, with proper standards of protection developed with the vital service industries most at risk. The effects of a High Altitude Electro-Magnetic Pulse Event as a result of a nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude, would be so serious that only government action could be expected to mitigate it. Security of satellites is a matter of growing concern as our reliance upon such systems and the sheer number of satellites in orbit increase.

The Defence Committee believes that the Government will need to make some difficult decisions on prioritisation if it embarks on a future mission similar to the Libya operation now that the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is taking effect. Although the UK was able to satisfy both operations in Libya and Afghanistan and its other standing tasks and commitments, the Libya operation was conducted before the implementation of many of the SDSR decisions on capability reductions. The Committee commends UK Armed Forces for their significant contribution to the successful conclusion of the Libya operation and comments on particular aspects and equipment used in the operation. It notes that at times the Royal Navy was unable to carry out several other important tasks owing to meeting the Libya commitment. Given the high levels of standing maritime commitments it is likely that this type of risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented. For the time being, there will continue to be a heavy reliance on US command and control functions for future NATO operations. The Committee also concerned that future NATO operations will not be possible if the US is not willing or able to provide capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence and refuelling aircraft. It should be a priority for NATO to examine this over-reliance on US capabilities and assets. This challenge will be heightened by the US stated intention to shift its military, geographic and strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region.

Although there has been a lot written about how counter-terrorism laws impact on human rights and civil liberties, most of this work has focussed on the most obvious or egregious kinds of human rights abrogation, such as extended detention, torture, and extraordinary rendition. Far less has been written about the complex ways in which Western governments have placed new and far-reaching limitations on freedom of speech in this context since 9/11. This book compares three liberal democracies - the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, in particular showing the commonalities and similarities in what has occurred in each country, and the changes in the appropriate parameters of freedom of speech in the counter-terrorism context since 9/11, achieved both in policy change and the justification for that change. In all three countries much speech has been criminalized in ways that were considered anachronistic, or inappropriate, in comparable policy areas prior to 9/11. This is particularly interesting because other works have suggested that the United States' unique protection of freedom of speech in the First Amendment has prevented speech being limited in that country in ways that have been pursued in others. This book shows that this kind of argument misses the detail of the policy change that has occurred, and privileges a textual reading over a more comprehensive policy-based understanding of the changes that have occurred. The author argues that we are now living a new-normal for freedom of speech, within which restrictions on speech that once would have been considered aberrant, overreaching, and impermissible are now considered ordinary, necessary, and justified as long as they occur in the counter-terrorism context. This change is persistent, and it has far reaching implications for the future of this foundational freedom.

On cover and title page: House, committees of the whole House, general committees and select committees

Last year over 35,000 journeys were delayed or cancelled due cable theft which also cost Network Rail more than £16m. Cable theft from the rail network is part of an increase in metal theft across the country made easy by the way in which stolen metal can be sold to scrap metal dealers. We need urgent reform to improve the audit trail generated by the scrap metal industry so that criminals selling stolen metal into the trade can be identified much more easily. The Committee calls for additional powers for the police to help them in their efforts to combat metal theft. The Government should introduce a new offence of aggravated trespass on the railway to help deter cable thieves. The British Transport Police should be given new powers so that officers can enter both registered and unregistered scrap metal sites along with additional resources to carry out their enforcement work". The Committee also recommends: i) The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 should be reformed so that individuals selling metal have to provide proof of their identity before a transaction can take place; ii) the Government should test the use of cashless trading in the scrap metal industry; iii) there should be greater clarity around compensation arrangements so that train operators cannot profit from disruption caused by cable theft; iv) Network Rail should develop a costed programme of measures to make cable more difficult to steal and v) the Department for Transport should update the Committee on work being undertaken to help passengers stranded on trains near stations to complete their journey

This is the story of the radical intervention carried out by the Thatcher administration in response to 1986-89 Monopolies and Mergers Commission inquiry into brewing. It describes the creation of big brewers, the official investigations into what many saw as an uncompetitive structure and the damaging consequences for consumers and licensees.