Since 2004 Egypt's growth has been accelerating in step with the launching of a series of ambitious reforms, reversing a trend during the preceding half-decade when Egypt's growth rate fell below that of most regional peers and well below that of the average developing country. This paper seeks to identify factors that held back Egypt's growth in the recent past, and explores whether recent reforms have removed the most binding constraints to allow at least a temporary growth spurt. Overall, the Egyptian reforms launched in 2004 appear to have focused well on the most critical constraints-reducing red tape and tax rates, and improving access to foreign exchange-thereby getting a strong growth response out of a limited set of reforms. However, inefficient bureaucracy remains an important obstacle to higher growth and reforms in this area should continue to have high payoffs. Ongoing reforms are also addressing constraints that are likely to become binding soon (or have become so already), such as inefficient financial intermediation and high public debt. Improvements in education may rapidly become a critical factor for sustaining higher growth.

The paper focuses its analysis on the last three decades of the twentieth century. The basic assumption is that Egypt's economic performance during this period was less than satisfactory compared with the most successful examples in the Far East and elsewhere. The paper also assumes that Egypt's initial conditions at mid-century compared favorably with the winners in the development race at the end of the century. Egypt has achieved positive progresst, yet compared with the higher performers in Asia, and given its favorable good initial conditions, the record seems quite mediocre. By mid-twentieth century, Egypt's agriculture had almost reached its limits. Egypt, therefore, faced a new challenge: a need to transform itself into an industrial society. This objective was only partially achieved. The paper identifies three interrelated factors that helped hinder Egypt's accession to a new industrial society. The first factor is a strong state and a weak society. An authoritarian state that in its endeavor to preserve its prerogatives had to give up good governance practices and limit the creative initiative of the individuals. The second factor is a semi-rentier economy. The availability of windfall revenues not only reduced the pressure for change but also promoted a new rentier mentality that undermined the emergence of an industrial spirit. The third factor is an inadequate education system. This system failed to provide the proper skills and values required for the industrial society. These factors, moreover, are interdependent and reinforce each other.

As emphasized by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, the policy challenge of boosting growth requires prioritization and identifying what are the most binding constraints. This paper draws on firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, which suggests that the obstacles for the functioning of firms is related to firm size. Recognizing the potential endogeneity and simultaneity between firms' constraints and firm size, we implement an Ordered-Probit model with a potential categorical endogenous regressor to estimate, for the case of Bolivia, the conditional probability of facing obstacles given the firm size category, while controlling for other factors. The results confirm the importance of allowing for the roles of firm size in identifying constraints and suggest priorities for policies to remove constraints to economic performance.

A multi-faceted account of Egyptian economic development by nineteen internationally recognized authorities and the critical challenges the economy is likely to face in the next twenty years The Egyptian Economy in the Twenty-first Century addresses the question of why Egypt, despite possessing a plethora of assets—such as a fertile agriculture, a strategic geographic location, oil and gas deposits, innumerable tourist sites, a labor force prized by regional countries, and a diaspora that remits large amounts of funds—has seldom performed to its economic potential during the last sixty years. Indeed, economic weakness created political weakness, and often exposed the country to foreign diktats. What should the country do to change this state of affairs? Nineteen internationally recognized authorities on the Egyptian economy discuss the critical challenges that the Egyptian economy is likely to face in the next two to three decades, challenges which must be overcome in order to improve the life of Egypt’s citizens and to protect the country from external pressures. Their analyses cover population and employment; development strategies; principal macroeconomic issues; development of a digital economy; fiscal and monetary matters; the external sector; poverty and income distribution; the enterprise structure; higher education; water availability; urbanization; institutional performance; and many others. Contributors: - Gouda Abdel Khalek, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt - Khaled M. Abu-Zeid, Regional Water Resources, CEDARE (Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe), Cairo, Egypt. - Fatma El Ashmawy, World Bank. - Ragui Assaad, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA - Izak Atiyas, Economic Research Forum, Cairo, Egypt. - Marwa Biltagy, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. - Lahcen Bounader, International Monetary Fund. - Ishac Diwan, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France. - Ahmed Ghoneim, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. - Khalid Ikram, Washington DC, USA. - Karima Korayem, al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt. - Heba el-Laithy, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. - Noha el-Mikawy, Ford Foundation, Middle East and North Africa, Cairo, Egypt. - Mohamed Mohieddin, Menoufia University, Menoufia, Egypt. - Heba Nassar, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. - Osman Mohamed Osman, Cairo, Egypt. - Noha Razek, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada. - David Sims, Cairo, Egypt. - John Waterbury, Princeton, New Jersey.