Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have witnessed rapid and significant increase in recent months, driven largely by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and associated sanctions im-posed on Russia. Other factors, including governments’ responses and export bans, have also con-tributed to rising prices (Laborde and Mamun 2022). Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February 2022.

Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans in response to concerns about commodity shortages, have also contributed to rising prices. Figure 1 examines price changes in key food and nonfood commodities between June 2021 and June 2022. The period of interest for this study is June 2021 to April 2022. Over this period, palm oil and wheat prices increased by 68 and 113 percent in nominal terms, respectively. When deflated by the US Consumer Price Index, these price changes equate to 56 and 100 percent in real terms. Wide variation exists across food products, with nominal maize prices increasing by 19 per-cent (or 11 percent in real terms), and rice prices declining by 13 percent (or 7 percent in real terms) over the same period. Prices of nonfood commodities also rose substantially. Whereas crude oil prices rose 44 percent (or 34 percent in real terms), natural gas and fertilizer prices both doubled (or 88 and 101 percent in real terms, respectively). As shown in the breakdown in the bar chart, most of the price growth occurred after the start of the war in Ukraine, except for fertilizer.

This paper analyzes the implications of the Russian-Ukraine crisis on global and regional food security. We start with a global vulnerability analysis to identify most vulnerable regions and countries. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is particularly vulnerable to trade shocks because of its high food import dependence. Thus, we provide descriptive evidence characterizing how food systems and policies impact vulnerability to the price shock in selected MENA countries: Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. Within these countries, we show that the crisis will differentially impact poor and non-poor households as well as rural and urban households. Although the absolute level of food insecurity may still be higher in rural areas where larger numbers of poor households are located, urban poor are likely to suffer most because of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and associated hikes in food prices, especially in those countries where social protection and food subsidies are missing. On the policy side, we review lessons from previous food crises and identify actions needed to take (and to avoid) to protect most vulnerable countries and households in the short-term while also highlighting long-term policy options to diversify food, fertilizer and energy production and trade.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has the potential to exacerbate food insecurity around the world as both countries are a major exporter of grains and other agricultural products. In this model based scenario study, medium-term effects of the war on agricultural production, trade flows, market prices, and food security are quantified. The scenarios focus on the possible consequences of macro-economic and agricultural production impacts in Ukraine, consequences of trade sanction measures against Russia, and related higher energy prices. From a food security perspective, we can conclude that there is enough food on the global level, but higher food prices could become a problem for a part of the population that has a low income and spends a large part of their food on cereals. For some countries highly dependent on imports of Ukrainian and Russian cereals like Egypt, Turkey and Middle East, food availability will come under some pressure. Food security impacts are very minor for the EU, as food availability is not a problem in the EU and in general people spend a small part on cereal-based food products.

New evidence this year corroborates the rise in world hunger observed in this report last year, sending a warning that more action is needed if we aspire to end world hunger and malnutrition in all its forms by 2030. Updated estimates show the number of people who suffer from hunger has been growing over the past three years, returning to prevailing levels from almost a decade ago. Although progress continues to be made in reducing child stunting, over 22 percent of children under five years of age are still affected. Other forms of malnutrition are also growing: adult obesity continues to increase in countries irrespective of their income levels, and many countries are coping with multiple forms of malnutrition at the same time – overweight and obesity, as well as anaemia in women, and child stunting and wasting.