In issue 51 of JFQ, the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, General James Mattis, USMC, published an article indicating that the "ideas reflected in EBO [effects-based operations], ONA [operational net assessment], and SoSA [system-of-systems analysis] have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for U.S. and multinational personnel." The commander then directed, "Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the terms and concepts related to EBO, ONA and SoSA in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME." The USJFCOM directive to "turn off" EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that "the term effects-based" is fundamentally flawed ... and goes against the very nature of war." We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect? -- to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed our security environment. The system of strategic deterrence in place since the beginning of the Cold War visibly collapsed. Now we are trying to fashion a new strategic deterrence that relies not so much on retaliation as on prevention, either stopping the terrorists outright, deterring the sponsors, or convincing them that terror cannot succeed. To help us deal with the pressing problems of the post-September 11th world, we have three ongoing technological revolutions in sensors, information technology, and weapons. These technologies can enable us to think differently about how we organize and fight. Indeed, this is what network-centric operations are about. Their true impact derives from how they are applied. Narrowly applied, they would produce more efficient attrition, yet they clearly can do much more. The concept of effects-based operations is the key to this broader role. It enables us to apply the power of the network-centric operations to the human dimension of war and to military operations across the spectrum of conflict from peace, to crisis, to war, which a new strategic deterrence demands. The broad utility of effects-based operations grows from the fact that they are focused on actions and their links to behavior, on stimulus and response, rather than on targets and damage infliction. They are applicable not only to traditional warfare, but also to military operations short of combat. Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war. In brief, network-centric operations are indeed a means to an end, and effects-based operations are that end.

Effects-based operations (EBO) are defined for thismonograph as operations conceived and planned in a systems framework thatconsiders the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.