Das Husserlbild der Gegenwart ist noch weitgehend gepragt von den erkenntnistheoretischen "Logischen Untersuchungen", durch die Husserl in weitem MaBe als Begriinder einer neuen objektiven Logik gilt. Mitunter wird er sogar als einseitig orien tierter Rationalist und Aufklarer des 20. J ahrhunderts, als der "Cartesius unserer Tage" 1 angesehen. Dieses Bild Husserls kann wohl jederzeit durch seine Veroffent lichungen gerechtfertigt werden. Dennoch ist es einseitig und recht vordergriindig, da dabei voll und ganz iibersehen wird, daB auch der Bereich des Emotionalen flir HusserI ein entscheiden gut wie nichts des Interessengebiet darstellt, wovon bislang so veroffentlicht worden ist. Wohl werden in seinen Schriften gclegentlich Fragen der Wertlehre, der Asthetik und Ethik angeschnitten 2, aber eine eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit derartigen Fragen liegt in keinem der veroffentlichten Werke vor. In Wirklichkeit aber war ihm die Begriindung einer echten wissenschaftlichen Ethik immer ein ernstes philosophisches An liegen. Bereits vor den "Logischen Untersuchungen" beschaf tigte sich Husserl mit ethischen Grundproblemen 3. Welche 1 Vgl. Briick, Maria, Dr. phil, Ubey das Verhiiltnis Hllsserls zu Franz Brentano, vor nehmlich mit Rucksicht auf Brentanos Psychologie, 1933, S. 7. Husserl selbst hat die Phiinomenologie in den "Cartesianischen Meditationen" (Husscrliana, Bd. I, 1950, S.

This book provides an analysis of values within the Husserlian phenomenological context. The authors included here answer the following questions: What are the lived-meanings of “values” and “ethics” from Husserl’s phenomenological perspective? How does society constitute its own life-word? What is an ethical reduction? How can we describe values as intentional objects? How does Husserl conceive the paradigm of a practical life? What is the essential structure of the experience of evaluation, or of valuing an object of perception? What is the experience of altruism? The book is divided into two parts: in the first part, Husserl’s phenomenology is argued as a method to describe pure intersubjective values which impact on our social and individual life; in the second part, Husserl’s ethical writings are used to discuss the issue of values themselves as practical objects. This volume sheds light on the open issue of value and practical experience beyond the common dichotomy between a positivistic and deontological perspective. In this sense, this book offers a third phenomenological way to expound this heated issue.

This book examines Husserl’s approach to the question concerning meaning in life and demonstrates that his philosophy includes a phenomenology of existence. Given his critique of the fashionable “philosophy of existence” of the late 1920s and early 1930s, one might think that Husserl posited an opposition between transcendental phenomenology and existential philosophy, as well as that in this respect he differed from existential phenomenologists after him. But texts composed between 1908 and 1937 and recently published in Husserliana XLII, Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie (2014), show that the existential Husserl was not opposed but open to the phenomenological investigation of several basic topics of a philosophy of existence. A collection of contributions from a team of internationally recognized scholars drawing on these and other sources, the present volume offers insights into the relationship between phenomenology and philosophy of existence. It does so by (1) delineating the basic outlines of Husserl’s phenomenology of existence, (2) reinterpreting the tension between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Jaspers’s and Heidegger’s philosophy of existence as well as Kierkegaard’s and Sartre’s existentialism, and (3) investigating the existential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological ethics. Thus focusing on neglected aspects of Husserl’s thought, the volume shows that there is a consensus between classical phenomenology and existential phenomenology on the urgency of addressing the existential questions that in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) Husserl calls “the questions concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of this entire human existence”. The Existential Husserl represents a major contribution to the clarification of the historical and philosophical developments from transcendental phenomenology to existential phenomenology. The book should appeal to a wide audience of many readers at all levels looking for phenomenological answers to existential questions.

Husserl's 20th-century phenomenological project remains the cornerstone of modern European philosophy. The place of ethics is of importance to the ongoing legacy and study of phenomenology itself. Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality constitutes one of the major new interventions in this burgeoning field of Husserl scholarship, and offers an unrivaled perspective on the question of ethics in Husserl's philosophy through a focus on volumes not yet translated into English. This book offers a refreshing perspective on stagnating ethical debates that pivot around conceptions of relativism and universalism, shedding light on a phenomenological ethics beyond the common dichotomy.

The question of relativism is a perennial one, and as fundamental and far reaching as the question of truth itself. Is truth absolute and universal, the same everywhere and for everyone? Or is truth historically, culturally, biologically, or otherwise relative, varying from one epoch or species to another? Although the issues surrounding relativism have attracted especially intense interest of late, they continue to spark heated controversies and to pose problems lacking an obvious resolution. On the side of one prevalent form of relativism, it is argued that we must finally recognize the historical and cultural contingency of our available means of cognition, and therefore abandon as naIve the absolute conception of truth dear to traditional philosophy. According to this line of thinking, even if there were univer sally valid principles, knowledge of them would not be possible for us, and thus an absolute conception of truth must be rejected in light of the demands of critical epistemology. However, when truth is accordingly relativized to some contingent subjective cognitive background, new difficulties arise. One of the most infamous of these is the logical inconsistency of the resulting thesis of relativism itself. Yet an even more serious problem is that the relativization of truth makes truth itself contingent, thereby undermining the motivation for preferring one belief or value to another, or even to its opposite.

It is a study of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. Through a critical discussion including practically all previously published English and German literature on the subject, the aim is to present a thorough and evenhanded account of the relation between the two. The book provides a detailed presentation of their respective projects and methods, and examines several of their key phenomenological analyses, centering on the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. It offers new perspectives on Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, e.g. concerning the importance of Husserl's phenomenology of the body, the relationship between the Husserlian concept of "constitution" and Heidegger's notion of "transcendence", as well as in its argument that "being" designates the central phenomenon for both phenomenologists. Though the study sacrifices nothing in terms of argumentative rigor or interpretative detail, it is written in such a way as to be accessible and rewarding to non-specialists and specialists alike.

In Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity, Janet Donohoe offers a compelling look into Husserl’s shift from a "static" to a "genetic" approach in his analysis of consciousness. Rather than view consciousness as an abstract unity, Husserl began investigating consciousness by taking into account the individual’s lived experiences. Engaging critics from contemporary analytic schools to third-generation phenomenologists, Donohoe shows that they often do not do justice to the breadth of Husserl’s thoughts. In separate chapters Donohoe elucidates the relevance of Husserl’s later genetic phenomenology to his work on time consciousness, intersubjectivity, and ethical issues. This much-needed synthesis of Husserl’s methodologies will be of interest to Husserl scholars, phenomenologists, and philosophers from both Continental and analytic schools.