Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.

The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.

This Edited Collection provides a rigorous and rich overview of current bargaining research in economics and related disciplines, as well as a discussion of future directions. The Editors create cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological synergies by bringing together bargaining researchers from various fields, including game theory, experimental economics, political economy, autonomous negotiations, artificial intelligence, environmental economics and behavioral operations management; as well as using various methods, including the strategic approach, axiomatic approach, empirical research, lab and field experiments, machine learning and decision support systems. Offering insights into the theoretical foundations of bargaining research, traditional applications to bargaining research and topics of growing importance due to new advances in technology and the changing political and physical landscape of the world, this book is a key tool for anyone working on or interested in bargaining.

Household and Economy: Welfare Economics of Endogenous Fertility deals with welfare economics and the socially optimal population size, as well as the social consequences of individual choice with respect to family size within each generation. The general equilibrium implications of endogenous fertility for a number of issues of population policy are discussed. In addition to their own consumption, the number of children and the utility of each child is assumed to enter the utility function of the parents. Comprised of 10 chapters, this volume begins with a review of social welfare criteria for optimal population size and the static theory of optimal population size, optimal population growth with exogenous fertility, and the theory of endogenous fertility. The reader is then introduced to the basic principles of welfare economics and the economics of externalities, followed by a summary of the traditional theory of household behavior. Subsequent chapters focus on optimal population size according to various social welfare criteria; real and potential externalities generated by the endogeneity of fertility; and the principal alternative reason for having children: to transfer resources from the present to support the future consumption of parents in old age. The book concludes by assessing the implications of endogenous fertility for within-generation income distribution policies and reflecting on the directions in which future research may be fruitful. This monograph will be of value to economists, social scientists, students of welfare economics, and those who wish to understand the contribution of economic analysis to an improved understanding of population policy.

It is often said economics has become as important as security in international relations, yet we work with much less than full understanding of what goes on when government negotiators bargain over trade, finance, and the rules of international economic organizations. The process of economic negotiation shapes the world political economy, John S. Odell says, and this essential process can be understood and practiced better than it is now.His absorbing book compares ten major economic negotiations since 1944 that have involved the United States. Odell gives the inside stories, targeting the strategies used by the negotiators, and explaining strategy choice as well as why the same strategy gains more in some situations and less in others. He identifies three broad factors—changing market conditions, negotiator beliefs, and domestic politics—as key influences on strategies and outcomes. The author develops an insightful mid-range theory premised on bounded rationality, setting it apart from the most common form of rational choice as well as from views that reject rationality. Negotiating the World Economy reveals a rich set of future research paths, and closes with guidelines for improving negotiation performance today. The main ideas are relevant for any country and for all who may be affected by economic bargaining.