Whether dealing with contracts, tort actions, or government regulations, lawyers are more likely to be successful if they are conversant in economics. Economics for Lawyers provides the essential tools to understand the economic basis of law. Through rigorous analysis illustrated with simple graphs and a wide range of legal examples, Richard Ippolito focuses on a few key concepts and shows how they play out in numerous applications. There are everyday problems: What is the social cost of legislation enforcing below-market prices, minimum wages, milk regulation, and noncompetitive pricing? Why are matinee movies cheaper than nighttime showings? And then there are broader questions: What is the patent system's role in the market for intellectual property rights? How does one think about externalities like airport noise? Is the free market, a regulated solution, or tort law the best way to deliver the "efficient amount of harm" in the workplace? What is the best approach to the question of economic compensation due to a person falsely imprisoned? Along the way, readers learn what economists mean when they talk about sorting, signaling, reputational assets, lemons markets, moral hazard, and adverse selection. They will learn a new vocabulary and a whole new way of thinking about the world they live in, and will be more productive in their professions.

Economics for Competition Lawyers provides a comprehensive explanation of the economic principles most relevant for competition law. Written specifically for competition lawyers, it uses real-world examples, is non-technical, and explains the key points from first principles.

The purpose of this casebook is to teach the principles of microeconomics. Economic Analysis for Lawyers presumes no prior training in economics and uses the same building block approach that is found in most microeconomics principles textbooks that are used in undergraduate economics classes. This book includes excerpted cases and other materials that illustrates the applicability of the economic principles to legal disputes and public policy issues. Fundamental principles are introduced in the first four chapters. Subsequent chapters build on these fundamentals by adding a detailed and sophisticated analysis in the general areas of monopoly, externalities, information, labor markets, risk, organizational economics, and financial economics. The result is a thorough introduction to the principles of microeconomics.

This book considers three relationships: law and economics; economics and game theory; and game theory and law. Economists teach lawyers that economic principles cut across and integrate seemingly different legal subjects such as contracts, torts, and property. Correspondingly, lawyers teach economists that legal rationality is a separate and distinct decision-making process that can be formalized by behavioral rules that are parallel to and comparable with the behavioral rules of economic rationality, that efficiency often must be constrained by legal goals such as equal protection of the laws, due process, and horizontal and distributional equity, and that the general case methodology of economics vs. the hard case methodology of law for determining the truth or falsity of economic theories and theorems sometimes conflict. Economics and Game Theory: Law and economics books focus on economic analysis of judges’ decisions in common law cases and have been mostly limited to contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and suit and settlement. There is usually no discussion of the many areas of law that require cooperative action such as is needed to provide economic infrastructure, control public “bad” type externalities, and make legislation. Game theory provides the bridge between competitive markets and the missing discussion of cooperative action in law and economics. How? Competitive markets are examples (subset) of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which explains the conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation both in economic markets and in legislative bodies and demonstrates the need for social infrastructure and regulation of pollution and global warming. Game Theory and Law: Lawsuits usually involve litigation between two parties, not the myriad participants in markets, so the assumption of self-interest constrained by markets does not carry over to legal disputes involving one-on-one bargaining in which the law gives one party superior bargaining power. Game theory models predict the effect of different legal institutions, rights, and rules on the outcome of such bargaining. Game theory also has a natural four-model framework which is used in this book to analyze the law and economics of civil obligation, which consists of torts (negligence), contracts, and unjust enrichment.

This Palgrave Pivot is the first book in the field of Law & Economics looking at the relationship between economics and law in legal reasoning. The book constitutes a reference point for the economic analysis of legal institutions, as legal reasoning remains the dimension of legal systems least explored by economists. Despite their differences, economics and legal reasoning interact in many interesting ways. This book offers a fast track to these interactions. Both supporters and critics of Law & Economics will be exposed to a yet-to-be developed area of interaction between the disciplines. This book will be of interest to economists, legal scholars, and Law and Economics specialists, and can be used as teaching material in courses on Law & Economics and legal reasoning as well.

Offers a comprehensive theory on the risks and benefits of incorporating economic theory in capital markets and corporate lawmaking.