Experts on the Japanese economy examine Japan's prolonged period of economic underperformance, analyzing the ways in which the financial system, monetary policy, and international financial factors contributed to its onset and duration. After experiencing spectacular economic growth and industrial development for much of the postwar era, Japan plunged abruptly into recession in the early 1990s and since then has suffered a prolonged period of economic stagnation, from which it is only now emerging. Japan's malaise, marked by recession or weak economic activity, commodity and asset price deflation, banking failures, increased bankruptcies, and rising unemployment, has been the most sustained economic downturn seen in the industrial world since the 1930s. In Japan's Great Stagnation, experts on the Japanese economy consider key questions about the causes and effects of Japan's prolonged period of economic underperformance and what other advanced economies might learn from Japan's experience. They focus on aspects of the financial and banking system that have contributed to economic stagnation, the role of monetary policy, and the importance of international financial factors--in particular, the exchange rate and the balance of payments. Among the topics discussed are bank fragility and the inaccuracy of measuring it by the "Japan premium," the consequences of weak banking regulation, the controversial policy of "quantitative easing," and the effectiveness of currency devaluation for fighting deflation. Taken together, the contributions demonstrate the importance of a sound financial sector in fostering robust growth and healthy economies--and the enormous economic costs of a dysfunctional financial system. Contributors Yoichi Arai, Robert Dekle, Zekeriya Eser, Eiji Fujii, Kimie Harada, Takeo Hoshi, Michael M. Hutchison, Takatoshi Ito, Ken Kletzer, Nikolas Müller-Plantenberg, Kunio Okina, Joe Peek, Eric S. Rosengren, Shigenori Shiratsuka, Mark M. Spiegel, Frank Westermann, Nobuyoshi Yamori

Japan’s dramatic transformation from economic success to economic stagnation offers important policy lessons to advanced countries everywhere that are struggling with stagnation. The term ‘Japanization’ is often used by economists to describe long-term stagnation and deflation. Symptoms include high unemployment, weak economic activity, interest rates near zero, quantitative easing, and population aging. In the global context, what can governments do to mitigate the downward trends experienced by Japan? This judiciously timed book investigates in depth the causes of Japan’s ‘lost decades’ versus the real recovery achieved by the United States, and the lessons that can be learned.

New perspectives on Japan's "lost decade" viewed in the context of recent financial turmoil.

As the global Great Recession continues, policymakers, economists, and the public are turning to Japenses economic revitalization for answers. Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate in Economics, once said that Japan was a "full-dress rehearsal for the current crisis." Japan has experienced and valiantly overcome the burst of their Bubble economy, financial crisis, lukewarm recovery, and more than a decade-long deflation and stagnation to become one of the most stable economies today. Japan's Great Stagnation and Abenomics reveals the striking similarities of economic events and policies between the Great Stagnation and the current Great Recession. It also suggests possible dangers ahead and way-outs in the future. This exciting new volume is based on Wakatabe's expertise in economic history and the history of economic ideas and argues that any policy decision is related to cultural ideology. An investigation into the relationship between cultural ideology and policy helps us better understand the policy-making process.

In the late 1980s, Japan's strong economic performance put it on a the verge of becoming a major player in regional and global affairs. But nearly a decade of economic stagnation, a mounting of bad debts, and a continuing stream of scandals have tarnished the country's distinctive economic model. At the turn of the millennium, the Japanese economy remained mired in a pattern of stagnation. As this disappointing condition dragged on, the government pursued policies to restore economic health. Yet Japan has been slow to embrace the systemic reform on which a robust economic recovery depends. In Arthritic Japan, Edward J. Lincoln examines the causes and implications of this weak response. Concluding that Japan is unlikely to pursue the vigorous reform necessary for economic growth, Lincoln warns of serious consequences: a stumbling economy bedeviled by recession and financial crisis, eroding leadership in economic and security issues, a continued defensive trade posture, and a disgruntled population that could turn a more nationalistic stance in foreign policy.

This book discusses Japan’s long-term economic recession and provides remedies for that recession that are useful for other Asian economies. The book addresses why Japan’s economy has stagnated since the bursting of its economic bubble in the 1990s. Its empirical analysis challenges the beliefs of some economists, such as Paul Krugman, that the Japanese economy is caught in a liquidity trap. This book argues that Japan’s economic stagnation stems from a vertical “investment–saving” (IS) curve rather than a liquidity trap. The impact of fiscal policy has declined drastically, and the Japanese economy faces structural problems rather than a temporary downturn. These structural problems have many causes: an aging demographic (a problem that is frequently overlooked), an over-reliance by local governments on transfers from the central government, and Basel capital requirements that have made Japanese banks reluctant to lend money to start-up businesses and small and medium-sized enterprises. This latter issue has discouraged Japanese innovation and technological progress. All these issues are addressed empirically and theoretically, and several remedies for Japan’s long-lasting recession are provided. This volume will be of interest to researchers and policy makers not only in Japan but also the People’s Republic of China, many countries in the eurozone, and the United States, which may face similar challenges in the future.

Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 70%, University of Hertfordshire (Business School), course: Economic Policy, language: English, abstract: This report will examine the economic stagnation in Japan in the 1990s. The second section will introduce the events in the 1990s and give the most important features, followed by a closer look at the chain of events, explaining what caused what in a chronological approach. From there, we will introduce a set of possible reasons for the depicted developments and the theoretical frameworks in the third and fourth section which will then lead to our conclusion based on the analysis given before, accommodating the conclusion of Krugman of Japan being in a liquidity trap in our findings. 2. Japan in the 90s - summarizing macroeconomic developments This section will introduce the phases considered, the building the “bubble” in the 80s, “burst” of the bubble in February 1991, continuous recession and seeming recovery in 1996 and renewed economic downturn from 1997 on until 2000, the end of the considered timeframe. a. Build-up of booming asset and real estate market - “bubble economy” Japans Economy in the 80s showed strong growth of above average, e.g. 4.1% ten year average growth in 1986 (Weinert, 2001, p. 461) and very low inflation (Baig, 2003, p. 5). Declining regulation of the financial sector and generally lax regulation led to a creditfuelled boom in the land- and asset-markets (Schrooten, 2000, p. 2). Within this process, the boom-financing bank-loans were built on collaterals of mostly land or stocks, accumulating risks in the loan books of the banks (Woo, 1999, p.7). b. “Burst” of the bubble By 1989, the Japanese stock market peaked, in 1992, land prices start to decline. Both are related to government intervention, the stock market was affected by a change of the discount rate by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the latter was influenced by a restriction of maximum loans to real estate in April 1990 (Baig, 2003, p. 8). The economic downturn in the aftermath was worsened by interconnection of bank loans and declining value of collaterals.