Drawing on Khalid Ikram's extensive knowledge of economic policymaking at the highest levels, The Political Economy of Reforms in Egypt lays out the enduring features of the Egyptian economy and its performance since 1952 before presenting an account of policy-making, growth and structural change under the country's successive presidents to the present day.

This book studies the impact of Egypt's Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP), the effects of which have been of great interest to the international community. Organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF uphold the programme as a success story and example for other countries to follow. ERSAP also has its critics, however, who resent its tendency to downsize government and fear possible negative effects on growth and development. The author discusses these concerns along with those regarding the possible negative social effects of ERSAP.

This book examines the character and consequences of Egypt's economic reform and structural adjustment programme of 1991, along with the second stage of reforms in 1996. It contributes to the debates underpinning the political economy of economic reform and agricultural reform.

Although the global economy is forecasted to shrink by 4.4 percent in 2020 (IMF 2020), the Egyptian economy is proving resilient to the immense human and financial costs caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. This resilience is mainly explained by the successful implementation of the economic reform program since 2016 that provided more fiscal space to withstand the adverse impact of the COVID-19 crisis. However, that Egypt’s economy is holding up is also due to the rapid response and proactive measures to limit the impact of the virus that were implemented by the Egyptian Government since March 2020 (MPED 2020). These enabled the country to avoid a full lockdown policy (Figure 1). While Egypt posted negative economic growth rates from April to June 2020 at the height of the crisis, overall economic growth was still positive at 3.6 percent for fiscal year (FY) 2019/20. This estimate is only slightly lower than the initial projection of the impact of the pandemic on Egypt’s economy of an annual economic growth equal to 3.8 percent, as estimated by staff of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED) (Breisinger et al. 2020). The deviation between the early and final estimate can be mainly explained by the lower than expected growth rates in the manufacturing and health services sectors and the better than expected performance of the trade and transport sectors.

The author argues in this text that the much-vaunted reform and liberalisation of Egypt's economy has been partial and selective, far from beneficial to all Egyptians. While the encouragement of the private sector has indeed benefited some, it has failed to improve the standard of living of others, in particular the lower middle classes and a large part of the landless rural population. Most importantly, economic reform and liberalisation have failed to produce a greater degree of political democracy: notions of political accountability, clean elections, a genuinely free press, the containment of police powers have turned out to be a great delusion which masks restrictions on political participation and civil liberties.