This volume is the product of a three-year collaborative project between Japanese and American scholars. Topics include foreign trade, foreign direct investment, coordination of monetary and fiscal policy, development assistance, telecommunications, intellectual property rights, and agricultural and corporate culture issues. The comparative analyses benefited from continuous dialogue among scholars from both sides of the Pacific.

Provides a general overview of literature relating to Japan and covers a broad range of subject matter, from art, feminism, and linguistics, to corporate culture, history, and medicine. Includes books published since 1980 that are related to the geographical area of Japan and to Japanese culture within that area.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

This volume discusses major macroeconomic policies and issues from theoretical and practical perspective focusing on the link between theory of macroeconomic management policy and its practice in the last few decades. The topics selected here are of persistent interest for those interested in economic policy - theorists and policists.

The perspectives of technologists, economists, and policymakers are brought together in this volume. It includes chapters dealing with approaches to assessment of technology leadership in the United States and Japan, an evaluation of future impacts of eroding U.S. technological preeminence, an analysis of the changing nature of technology-based global competition, and a discussion of policy options for the United States.