Liability effects on the economic performance of the pharmaceutical industry play a prominent role in the debate about the economic effects of product liability in the United States. The author analyzes incentive effects on company decisions, implications for economic outcomes such as drug safety and effectiveness, and suggests how public policy changes could mitigate liability-based sources of inefficient decisions of pharmaceutical companies.

This study examined the economic effects of product liability on firms producing drugs and medical devices. The study found that the liability system enhances the economic contributions of the industries in some ways.

A Brookings Institution Press and American Enterprise Institute publication Are liability "crises" an inevitable part of the modern industrial landscape? Does the inherent nature of the insurance industry promote recurring liability crises? What have been the effects of the liability reforms of the 1990s? Should lawyers be given de facto regulatory authority? This report provides perspective on these and other key issues concerning the law and economics of products liability. The authors begins with a brief description of the evolution of products liability doctrine in the U.S., up to the point of the liability crisis of the late 1980s. They discuss the economic implications of product risk for both consumers and producers, offer economic hypothesis on the implications of the increased scope of liability and subsequent reforms, and provide an update of trends in litigation and liability law. The book ends with a discussion of pending legislation and prospects for further improvements. Moore and Viscusi make the point that effective liability policy calls for a balancing of the incentives for improved public safety on one hand, and the benefits of new and existing products on the other.

A collection of papers from the ninth Fulbright Colloquium held in September 1989. The papers compare legal practices and procedures in North America and Europe and the barriers to drug development caused by increased litigation in cases involving pharmaceutical products.

Liability effects on the economic performance of the pharmaceutical industry play a prominent role in the debate about the economic effects of product liability in the United States. The author analyzes incentive effects on company decisions, implications for economic outcomes such as drug safety and effectiveness, and suggests how public policy changes could mitigate liability-based sources of inefficient decisions of pharmaceutical companies.

The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this. You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email. In the United States, drugs are jointly regulated by the US Food and Drug Administration, which oversees premarket clinical trials designed to ensure drug safety and efficacy, and the liability system, which allows patients to sue manufacturers for unsafe drugs. In this paper, we examine the potential welfare effects of this dual system to ensure the safety of medical products, and conclude that product liability exemptions for FDA regulated activities could raise economic efficiency. When the safety level mandated by the FDA is binding-in the sense that manufacturers will not conduct additional clinical testing beyond what is mandated by FDA-then product liability may reduce efficiency by raising prices without pushing firms, who are already bound by the FDA's requirements, to invest further in product safety. We consider as a case study the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which sharply reduced vaccine manufacturer's liability in 1988. We find evidence that the program reduced prices without affecting vaccine safety, suggest that liability limits can enhance economic efficiency in the presence of the FDA.

With an ever-increasing number of liability lawsuits, are corporations electing to play it safe rather than risk the uncertainties accompanying innovation? In The Liability Maze experts address the issues surrounding safety and innovation and present the most detailed and comprehensive study to date on the actual impact of U.S. liability law. In recent decades it has been widely assumed that liability laws promote safety by significantly raising the price companies must pay for negligence, product defects and accidents. More recently, others have suggested that the broad and unpredictable sweep of these laws actually deters innovation. The risks of lawsuits are so great that corporations are showing more caution in product innovation than ever before. The contributors focus on five sectors of the economy where the liability system appears to have had the greatest effects, positive or negative: the private aircraft, automobile, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries, and the medical profession. They suggest that in many sectors liability law has hampered innovation. In others it has stimulated safety improvements, although perhaps not so much as vigilant safety regulations.