In many respects this book represents a considerable departure from traditional works on international relations in the Middle East. Instead of offering partial explanations based on conventional approaches, this book attempts to incorporate studies with different methodological approaches and with the Middle East. Foreign affairs specialists offer balanced and linguistically neutral commentaries, while marshalling empirical data to support their analyses. The result is a broad synthesis which helps the reader see the larger picture despite its complexity. The Middle East is considered as a subordinate system of the international political system in Part 1. The chapters in this section focus on the nations of the area and their interactions within the subsystem. The papers also examine the implications of these interactions to the nations outside the Middle East. In Part 2 the scope of inquiry is enlarged to treat interactions between the major world powers and the nations of the Middle East. Papers in Part 3 focus upon American foreign policy in the Middle East. This portion examines the roles of various special-interest groups such as the oil companies, Zionists, the United States Congress, newspapers, and religious bodies as they relate to the formation of American policy for the Middle East. In essence, The Middle East is an "international relations" study of the Middle East. Additionally, it has new material—the treatment of religious influences upon the Middle East, the attitudes of some major newspapers towards the middle East conflict, and the domestic position of Israel regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict—seldom discussed in other works.

A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.