In the late 1990s, economic and financial crises raged through East Asia, devastating economies that had previously been considered among the strongest in the developing world. The crises eventually spread to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America, and impacted the economies of many industrialized nations as well. In today's increasingly interdependent world, finding ways to reduce the risk of future crises—and to improve the management of crises when they occur—has become an international policy challenge of paramount importance. This book rises to that challenge, presenting accessible papers and commentaries on the topic not only from leading academic economists, but also from high-ranking government officials (in both industrial and developing nations), senior policymakers at international institutions, and major financial investors. Six non-technical papers, each written by a specialist in the topic, provide essential economic background, introducing sections on exchange rate regimes, financial policies, industrial country policies, IMF stabilization policies, IMF structural programs, and creditor relations. Next, personal statements from the major players give firsthand accounts of what really went on behind the scenes during the crises, giving us a rare glimpse into how international economic policy decisions are actually made. Finally, wide-ranging discussions and debates sparked by these papers and statements are summarized at the end of each section. The result is an indispensable overview of the key issues at work in these crises, written by the people who move markets and reshape economies, and accessible to not just economists and policymakers, but also to educated general readers. Contributors: Montek S. Ahluwalia, Domingo F. Cavallo, William R. Cline, Andrew Crockett, Michael P. Dooley, Sebastian Edwards, Stanley Fischer, Arminio Fraga, Jeffrey Frankel, Jacob Frenkel, Timothy F. Geithner, Morris Goldstein, Paul Keating, Mervyn King, Anne O. Krueger, Roberto Mendoza, Frederic S. Mishkin, Guillermo Ortiz, Yung Chul Park, Nouriel Roubini, Robert Rubin, Jeffrey Sachs, Ammar Siamwalla, George Soros

The management of financial crises in emerging markets is a vital and high-stakes challenge in an increasingly global economy. For this reason, it's also a highly contentious issue in today's public policy circles. In this book, leading economists-many of whom have also participated in policy debates on these issues-consider how best to reduce the frequency and cost of such crises. The contributions here explore the management process from the beginning of a crisis to the long-term effects of the techniques used to minimize it. The first three chapters focus on the earliest responses and the immediate defense of a currency under attack, exploring whether unnecessary damage to economies can be avoided by adopting the right response within the first few days of a financial crisis. Next, contributors examine the adjustment programs that follow, considering how to design these programs so that they shorten the recovery phase, encourage economic growth, and minimize the probability of future difficulties. Finally, the last four papers analyze the actual effects of adjustment programs, asking whether they accomplish what they are designed to do-and whether, as many critics assert, they impose disproportionate costs on the poorest members of society. Recent high-profile currency crises have proven not only how harmful they can be to neighboring economies and trading partners, but also how important policy responses can be in determining their duration and severity. Economists and policymakers will welcome the insightful evaluations in this important volume, and those of its companion, Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey A. Frankel's Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets.

In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of “decontrolled” financial innovations because they were enjoying from the “great moderation.” Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital flows augmented in relevance thereafter. Initially economic authorities accurately responded to the challenge, but unconventional monetary policies in the US began to create important spillovers in EMEs. Furthermore, in contrast to a previous surge in liquidity, funds were now transmitted to EMEs throughout the bond market. The perspective of an increase in US interest rates by the FED is generating a reversal of expectations and a sudden flight to quality. Emerging countries’ currencies began to experience higher volatility levels, and depreciation movements against a newly strong US dollar are also increasingly observed. Consequently, there are increasing doubts that the “unexpected” favorable outcome observed in most EMEs at the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) would remain.

In recent years we have seen a growing number of banking and financial crises in emerging market countries, with great costs to their economies. But we now have a much better understanding of why these crises occur and a better idea how they can be prevented.

Recurrent crises in emerging markets and in advanced economies in the last decades cast doubt about the ability of financial liberalization to meet the aims of sustainable economic growth and development. The increasing importance of financial markets and financial efficiency criterion over economic decisions and policies since the 1980s laid down the conditions of the development process of emerging market economies. Numerous crises experienced thereafter gave rise to flourishing work on the links between financialization and economic development. Several decades of observations and lessons can now be integrated into economic and econometric models to give more sophisticated and multivariable approaches to financial development with respect to growth and development issues. In the markets-based and private-enterprise dominated world economy, two conditions for a successful growth-enhancing financial evolution can at least be brought fore: macroeconomic stability and consistent supervision. But even after the 2007-2008 global crisis, economists do not agree on the meaning of those conditions. For liberal and equilibrium-market economists, good finance and supervision mean market-friendly structures while for institutionalists, post-Keynesian and Marxist economists, good finance and supervision must lie in collectively designed and managed public structures. Drawing heavily on the tumultuous crises of the 1990s-2000s, this book argues that those experiences can shed light on such a crucial issue and lead economic theory and policy to go beyond the blindness of efficient free markets doctrine to economic catastrophes. It also points to new challenges to global stability in the wake of reconfiguration of international financial arena under the weight of major emerging market economies.

In recent years we have seen a growing number of banking and financial crises in emerging market countries, with great costs to their economies. But we now have a much better understanding of why these crises occur and a better idea how they can be prevented.Mishkin defines a financial crisis as a disruption in financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As financial markets become unable to function efficiently, economic activity sharply contracts. Factors that promote financial crises include, mainly, a deterioration in financial sector balance sheets, increases in interest rates and in uncertainty, and deterioration in nonfinancial balance sheets because of changes in asset prices.Financial policies in 12 areas could help make financial crises less likely in emerging market economies, says Mishkin. He discusses:- Prudential supervision.- Accounting and disclosure requirements.- Legal and judicial systems.- Market-based discipline.- Entry of foreign banks.- Capital controls.- Reduction of the role of state-owned financial institutions.- Restrictions on foreign-denominated debt.- The elimination of too-big-to-fail practices in the corporate sector.- The proper sequencing of financial liberalization.- Monetary policy and price stability.- Exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange reserves.If the political will to adopt sound policies in these areas grows in emerging market economies, their financial systems should become healthier, with substantial gains both from greater economic growth and smaller economic fluctuations.This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - was prepared for the NBER conference, quot;Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies,quot; Woodstock, Vermont, October 19-21, 2001. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Business economics - Miscellaneous, grade: 1.3, Marmara University (Department of Economics), course: Seminar Paper, 34 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: This paper attemps to picture the economical background of Turkey prior to the 2001 crisis, and then analyze the main characteristics of environment in which such a large scale nancial crisis could break out. The following section will rstly introduce an overview of the basic theoretical literature on nancial crises in emerging markets, as this may contribute towards a better comprehension of the economical interrelations of the theoretical framework in which the Turkish nancial crisis is embedded. Section 3, then, provides the Turkish case in detail. To familiarize the reader with the economical and political enviroment in which the crisis could occur, the rst subsection will provide a brief account of the Turkish economy prior to the crisis, special emphasis will be on the nancial liberalization proccess and the resulting changes in the banking sector. The tide of events of the crisis itself as well as its economical consequences and policy responses are part of the second and third subsection respectively. The paper will be concluded by summing up the essential causes and main characteristics of the crisis and an attempt to assign its place in the theoretical framework.