Through original and incisive contributions from leading scholars, this book applies economics and other rational choice methods to an understanding of public international law, providing a bird’s eye view of some of its most fundamental elements from the perspective of economics. The chapters cover a range of topics, beginning with the building blocks of the nation state and continuing with the sources and the enforcement of international law and its various applications and extensions. The application of economic analysis to public international law is still in its formative stages and Economic Analysis of International Law provides a useful overview, as well as setting directions for new research. This volume provides a path through recent literature while identifying new areas and issues for research, making it an invaluable resource for scholars of public international law.

This book presents policymakers and scholars with an over-arching analytical model of international law, one that demonstrates the potential of international law, but also explains how policymakers should choose among different international legal structures.

Economic analysis is also the key to measuring the efficacy of current anti-corruption instruments, and in the light of this the book finds many existing legal counter-measures lacking. On the other hand, its assessment of new international instruments

Exchange of goods and ideas among nations, cross-border pollution, global warming, and international crime pose formidable questions for international law. Two respected scholars provide an intellectual framework for assessing these problems from a rational choice perspective and describe conditions under which international law succeeds or fails.

Economic Analysis of the Arbitrator’s Function Bruno Guandalini Arbitration has become an important market, where arbitrators are rational economic agents maximizing their utility. Although this is self-evident, it is rarely discussed. This penetrating book is the first to comprehensively analyze the market for arbitrators and arbitrators’ economic role within it. In great depth, the author tackles such salient issues as the following: effect of perceived inefficiencies and high costs on arbitration legitimacy; alleged commercialization of the arbitrator’s function; possible ethical problem raised by financial remuneration for rendering justice; what motivates a person to arbitrate; market for arbitrators’ functioning and failures, providing a better understanding of how actors could behave in such a specific market; structural and artificial entry barriers; effect of an arbitrator’s strategic behavior on the arbitrator’s function; limitations on an arbitrator’s rationality; and preventing and correcting these limitations. Numerous references to customs and procedures in major arbitral jurisdictions and to international laws and conventions affecting the efficiency of the arbitrator’s function are included. Pursuing a non-prescriptive analysis, the author draws on the discipline of law and economics, rational choice theory, behavioral economics, and psychological work on bounded rationality. Understanding the arbitrator’s function as a legal institution that is influenced by the market, this pioneer in developing and systematizing the study of the market for arbitrators and how it works will prove of inestimable value to all stakeholders in the arbitration market. Arbitrators, policymakers, regulators, and academics will be enabled to open the way to a more efficient market for arbitrators and betterment in arbitration worldwide.

This original and insightful book considers the ways in which public law, which emphasises legality (the Demos), and economics, a science oriented towards the markets (the Agora), intertwine. Throughout, George Dellis argues that the concepts of legality and efficiency should not be perceived separately.

Since the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the resurgence of (economic) nationalism, economic warfare has become an increasingly important substitute for actual hostilities between states. Its manifestations range from medieval sieges to modern day trade wars. Despite its long history, economic warfare remains an elusive term, foreign to international law. This book seeks to identify those portions of international law that are applicable to economic warfare. What is the status quo of regulation? Is there a jus ad bellum oeconomicum? A jus in bello oeconomico? After putting forward its own definition of economic warfare, the book reviews historical case studies – reflecting the three main branches of international economic law: trade, investment and currency – to identify pertinent legal boundaries. While the case studies reveal that numerous rules of international (economic) law regulate (specific measures of) economic warfare, it remains to be seen whether – analogously to the prohibition of the threat or use of force – these selective limitations have the potential to coalesce into a general prohibition of economic warfare in the future.