Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews and illustrates earnings management, conservatism, and their effects on earnings quality in an economic modeling framework. Both earnings management and conservative accounting introduce biases to financial reports. The fundamental issue addressed is what economic effects these biases have on earnings quality or financial reporting quality. Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews analytical models of earnings management and conservatism and shows that both can have beneficial or detrimental economic effects, so a differentiated view is appropriate. Earnings management can provide additional information via the financial reporting communication channel, but it can also be used to misrepresent the firm's position. What the authors find is that similar to earnings management, conservatism can reduce the information content of financial reports if it suppresses relevant information, but it can be a desirable feature that improves economic efficiency. The approach to study earnings management, conservatism, and earnings quality is based on the information economics literature. A variety of analytical models are reviewed that capture the effects and subtle interactions of managers' incentives and rational expectations of users. The benefit of analytical models is to make precise these, often highly complex, strategic effects. They offer a rigorous explanation for the phenomena and show that sometimes conventional wisdom does not apply. The monograph is organized around a few basic model settings, which are presented in simple versions first and then in extensions to elicit the main insights most clearly. Chapter 2 presents the basic rational expectations equilibrium model with earnings management and rational inferences by the capital market. Chapter 3 is devoted to earnings quality and earnings quality metrics used in many studies. Chapter 4 studies conservatism in accounting. Finally, the authors examine the interaction between conservatism and earnings management. Each chapter ends with a section containing a summary of the main findings and conclusions.

This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.

This book provides an overview of earnings quality (EQ) in the context of financial reporting and offers suggestions for defining and measuring it. Although EQ has received increasing attention from investors, creditors, regulators, and researchers in different areas, there are various definitions of it and different approaches for its measurement. The book describes the relationship between EQ and earnings management (EM) since they can be considered related challenges, especially in the context of international financial reporting standards (IAS/IFRSs). EM occurs when managers make discretionary accounting choices that are regarded as either an efficient communication of private information to improve the informativeness of a firm’s current and future performance, or a distorting disclosure to mislead the firm’s true performance. The intentional manipulation of earnings by managers, within the limits allowed by the accounting standards, may alter the usefulness of financial reporting and lead to lower quality of earnings. The use of fair value in financial reporting has created a current debate about the impact it might have on EQ. At times, the high subjectivity in estimating fair value can allow opportunities for the exercise of management judgments and intentional bias, which can reduce the quality of financial reporting. Management discretion can result in high EM and hence in a reduction of EQ. Particularly during difficult financial periods, managers engage in EM to mask the negative effects of the turmoil, and in such circumstances accruals and earnings smoothing are attempts to reduce abnormal variations of earnings in such circumstances. This book is a valuable resource for those interested in wider perspectives on EQ and it adds to the research studies on this topic in the context of financial reporting.

This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.

The purpose research is to examine other variables that also affect the relationship between conservatism and earnings quality. Good Corporate Governance is a set of mechanisms that can protect minority shareholders from expropriation by managers and insider shareholders with an emphasis on legal mechanisms.Data Population are companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2010-20015. The sample selection is based on purposive sampling method with the purpose of obtaining a representative sample. An Alternative measure of accounting conservatism used is the instrumental variables of Accounting conservatism (VIKV) developed by Lo (2005). The quality of earnings can be measured through discretionary accruals calculated by way of setting aside total accruals (TACC) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDACC). In calculating DACC, Modified Jones Model is used because it is considered better among other models to measure earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995).The results of this study indicate that the Instrumental Variables Conservatism (VIK) has a significant positive effect on the Earning Quality. This means that management positively signals the application of accounting conservatism within the company and has an impact on improving the quality of earnings. The next investor is expected to provide more valuations by providing a high premium for the company's stock price.

Master's Thesis from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, University of Duisburg-Essen, course: Master Thesis, language: English, abstract: This paper delves into various theories and approaches, aiming to define and differentiate earnings management from related concepts such as fraud, expectation management, and impression management. It explores the goals and incentives driving earnings management, including maximizing or minimizing earnings, beating targets, and smoothing. At the onset of the new millennium, corporate scandals rocked the business world, eroding trust in management, boards of directors, and the accounting profession. In response, regulations and policies aimed at enhancing corporate governance and financial reporting were swiftly implemented. The credibility, clarity, and consistency of financial reporting practices play a pivotal role in enabling investors to make informed decisions. Accurate and fair financial performance representations, as opposed to inflated and misleading figures, are essential for market players, including shareholders and creditors. Investors rely on audited financial reports to guide their investment decisions, underscoring the critical importance of accuracy and reliability in publicly available financial disclosures. Auditors, by reducing the risk of material misstatement, ensure the integrity of the information disclosed in a company's financial statements. Management, with the goal of achieving promised targets and ensuring the company's existence, may engage in earnings management as a strategic contribution to corporate policy. Financial reporting serves as a means to distinguish well-performing companies from their counterparts, facilitating efficient resource allocation and empowering stakeholders to make effective decisions. The disclosed earnings results significantly impact a firm's overall business activities and management decisions, particularly in satisfying analysts' expectations, which can influence equity value. While accounting standards play a role, the quality of financial statements is more influenced by company-specific and institutional factors shaping managers' incentives. These factors lead to financial reporting practices being viewed as the outcome of a cost-benefit assessment.