Two central themes run through this book. The first is the workings of the various 'measures authorised by the law so as to keep the streams of justice pure', and the second is the recent development of family law, focusing particularly on Lord Denning's contribution to the law of husband and wife.

In The Arc of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, Sullivan and Massaro identify the historical underpinnings of due process while describing the evolution of the American due process doctrine.

An authoritative two volume dictionary covering English law from earliest times up to the present day, giving a definition and an explanation of every legal term old and new. Provides detailed statements of legal terms as well as their historical context.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines "international law" to include not only "custom" and "convention" between States but also "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" within their municipal legal systems. In 1953, Bin Cheng wrote his seminal book on general principles, identifying core legal principles common to various domestic legal systems across the globe. This monograph summarizes and analyzes the general principles of law and norms of international due process, with a particular focus on developments since Cheng's writing. The aim is to collect and distill these principles and norms in a single volume as a practical resource for international law jurists, advocates, and scholars. The information contained in this book holds considerable importance given the growth of inter-state intercourse resulting in the increased use of general principles over the past 60 years. General principles can serve as rules of decision, whether in interpreting a treaty or contract, determining causation, or ascertaining unjust enrichment. They also include a core set of procedural requirements that should be followed in any adjudicative system, such as the right to impartiality and the prohibition on fraud. Although the general principles are, by definition, basic and even rudimentary, they hold vital importance for the rule of law in international relations. They are meant not to define a rule of law, but rather the rule of law.

A strong and lively defense of substantive due process. From reproductive rights to marriage for same-sex couples, many of our basic liberties owe their protection to landmark Supreme Court decisions that have hinged on the doctrine of substantive due process. This doctrine is controversial—a battleground for opposing views around the relationship between law and morality in circumstances of moral pluralism—and is deeply vulnerable today. Against recurring charges that the practice of substantive due process is dangerously indeterminate and irredeemably undemocratic, Constructing Basic Liberties reveals the underlying coherence and structure of substantive due process and defends it as integral to our constitutional democracy. Reviewing the development of the doctrine over the last half-century, James E. Fleming rebuts popular arguments against substantive due process and shows that the Supreme Court has constructed basic liberties through common law constitutional interpretation: reasoning by analogy from one case to the next and making complex normative judgments about what basic liberties are significant for personal self-government. Elaborating key distinctions and tools for interpretation, Fleming makes a powerful case that substantive due process is a worthy practice that is based on the best understanding of our constitutional commitments to protecting ordered liberty and securing the status and benefits of equal citizenship for all.

Mindful of the English background and of constitutional developments in the several states, Orth in a succinct and readable narrative traces the history of due process, from its origins in medieval England to its applications in the latest cases. Departing from the usual approach to American constitutional law, Orth places the history of due process in the larger context of the common law. To a degree not always appreciated today, constitutional law advances in the same case-by-case manner as other legal rules. In that light, Orth concentrates on the general maxims or paradigms that guided the judges in their decisions of specific cases. Uncovering the links between one case and another, Orth describes how a commitment to fair procedures made way for an emphasis on the protection of property rights, which in turn led to a heightened sensitivity to individual rights in general.