This book examines US policy toward Iran and Iraq during the 1990s and the impact of domestic politics on the US approach to the Persian Gulf. It offers a new theoretical perspective.

Scholars of international relations tend to prefer one model or another in explaining the foreign policy behavior of governments. Steve Yetiv, however, advocates an approach that applies five familiar models: rational actor, cognitive, domestic politics, groupthink, and bureaucratic politics. Drawing on the widest set of primary sources and interviews with key actors to date, he applies each of these models to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis and to the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003. Probing the strengths and shortcomings of each model in explaining how and why the United States decided to proceed with the Persian Gulf War, he shows that all models (with the exception of the government politics model) contribute in some way to our understanding of the event. No one model provides the best explanation, but when all five are used, a fuller and more complete understanding emerges. In the case of the Gulf War, Yetiv demonstrates the limits of models that presume rational decision-making as well as the crucial importance of using various perspectives. Drawing partly on the Gulf War case, he also develops innovative theories about when groupthink can actually produce a positive outcome and about the conditions under which government politics will likely be avoided. He shows that the best explanations for government behavior ultimately integrate empirical insights yielded from both international and domestic theory, which scholars have often seen as analytically separate. With its use of the Persian Gulf crisis as a teachable case study and coverage of the more recent Iraq war, Explaining Foreign Policy will be of interest to students and scholars of foreign policy, international relations, and related fields.

This book offers a concise account of US "dual containment" policy towards Iran and Iraq during the 1990s, an overlooked era between the tumult of the liberation of Kuwait and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In particular, it uses a theoretical framework derived from neoclassical realism to examine the impact of domestic US politics and interest groups on policymaking, as well as perceptions of threat derived from two decades of mutual hostility between the US and Iran.

This book examines the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the states of the Persian Gulf from 1979 to 1998. It covers perceptions Iranians and Arabs have of each other, Islamic revolutionary ideology, the Iran/Iraq war, the Gulf crisis, the election of President Khatami and finally the role of external powers, such as the United States. The author argues that over the twenty-year period, the policy has moved from being ideological to pragmatic; and that by tracing its history, we can better anticipate its future relationship.

Research completed January 1993.

Examines Iran's current nuclear potential while charting America's future course of action, recounting the prolonged clash between both nations to outline options for American policymakers.