A revealing exploration of nation-building around the world and its related problems and challenges—from conflict to the role of democracy. Nation-Building: A Reference Handbook offers an in-depth examination of the nation-building process with special focus on the late 20th century to the present. U.S. national security expert Cynthia Watson explores economic, political, and social aspects of nation-building and provides unique insight into hot issues and fundamental concerns. Presenting nation-building from many perspectives, Watson discusses states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkan countries, and East Timor, among others. She illustrates the challenges of rebuilding a country's infrastructure as well as unanticipated problems. The work provides a thorough treatment of the role that democracy plays in the nation-building process and illuminates the position of the United States juxtaposed with UN peacekeeping efforts. This one-of-a-kind reference work is complete with primary source documents, biographical sketches, and resource suggestions.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.

Publisher Description

In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved in missions other than conventional warfare. These include low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military leadership and civil-military relations have changed. Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations, and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness.

This book analyzes the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952). It begins by explaining why Japan spent roughly fifty years building its own colonial system and declaring war on China and the Western Allies, only to decide after military defeats, two atomic bombings and the Soviet declaration of war, to surrender before being invaded. It goes on to describe the controversial issues surrounding the conduct of the Occupation forces, the largely American reform proposals and the shifts in policy as the Cold War developed. Particular emphasis is placed on women’s issues, the Japanese and American reactions to President Truman’s decision to fire General Douglas MacArthur, the tensions surrounding the requirement that the Japanese allow US military bases to stay in Japan and the still ongoing debate over the American decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan. Despite all this, the book concludes that particularly when compared with later Allied nation building efforts in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq and the current state of US politics, the Occupation experience was, on the whole, a relatively positive one for both the Japanese and the US-Japan alliance.

Army Chief of Staff, Medal of Honor winner, commander of the Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War, Governor General of the Philippines, and presidential candidate, Wood was one of a select cadre of men that transformed the American military at the turn of the century, turning it into a modern fighting force and the nation into a world power.".

Seymour Morris Jr. combines political history, military biography, and business management to tell the story of General Douglas MacArthur's tremendous success in rebuilding Japan after World War II in Supreme Commander, a lively, in-depth work of biographical history complementary to The Generals, The Storm of War, and Truman. He is the most decorated general in American history—and the only five five-star general to receive the Medal of Honor. Yet Douglas MacArthur's greatest victory was not in war but in peace. As the uniquely titled Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, he was charged with transforming a defeated, militarist empire into a beacon of peace and democracy—“the greatest gamble ever attempted,” he called it. A career military man, MacArthur had no experience in politics, diplomacy, or economics. A vain, reclusive, and self-centered man, his many enemies in Washington thought he was a flaming peacock, and few, including President Harry Truman's closest advisors, gave him a chance of succeeding. Yet MacArthur did so brilliantly, defying timetables and expectations. Supreme Commander tells for the first time, the story of how MacArthur's leadership achieved a nation-building success that had never been attempted before—and never replicated since. Seymour Morris Jr. reveals this flawed man at his best who treated a defeated enemy with respect; who made informed and thoughtful decisions yet could be brash and stubborn when necessary, and who lead the Occupation with intelligence, class, and compassion. Morris analyzes MacArthur's key tactical choices, explaining how each contributed to his accomplishment, and paints a detailed picture of a true patriot—a man of conviction who proved to be an outstanding and effective leader in the most extraordinary circumstances.