Myanmar experienced four distinct COVID shocks to its economy over 2020 to early 2022 as well as a military takeover in February 2021 that created severe political, civil and economic turmoil. COVID and the coup d’état reversed a decade of growth and poverty reduction, but the full extent of the crisis on household poverty has remained uncertain because of the challenges of conducting large-scale in-person welfare surveys during the pandemic and recent political instability. Here we combine ex ante simulation models with diverse phone survey evidence from mid-2020 to early 2022 to estimate the poverty impacts of these shocks and some of the mechanisms behind them. Both simulations and surveys are consistent in painting a grim picture of rising poverty, capital-depleting coping mechanisms, and the complete collapse of government-provided social protection.

After decades of isolationism and economic stagnation, Myanmar opened its economy in the beginning of the 2010s, leading to rapid economic growth (Myanmar’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was almost 50 percent larger in 2020 than in 2011). But the COVID-19 health crisis that started in 2020 and a military coup in the beginning of 2021 – and the subsequent increase in conflicts, forced displacements, and migration – dramatically reversed that outlook, with Myanmar’s GDP in 2022 estimated to be 13 percent smaller than three years earlier. The agricultural sector also changed accordingly during this period.

This study explores the transformation of Myanmar’s rice value chain (VC) over a period of liberalization, reform, and infrastructure expansion from 2013 to 2019, and over a period of multiple crises from 2020 to 2022 including a military coup and widespread conflict. We analyze modernization over these periods at different levels of the VC, including upstream (farms), midstream (mills), and downstream (rice vendors). We rely upon unique data from large-scale phone surveys collected at different segments of the rice value chain – including farm and post-farmgate – complemented with insights from key informant interviews, and secondary data. The major findings are the following: There have been large transformations within the rice value chain over the last decade, but modernization in some areas decelerated due to conflict. We note a process of modernization, upscaling, quality improvements, and increased outsourcing of agricultural activities to specialized service providers by farmers. The majority of this transformation occurred during the period of relative stability from 2013 to 2019. We show that although modernization continued during the crisis years that followed, including an improvement in rice quality and an expansion of modern mills, many modernization processes decelerated. Mills and farms in insecure and conflict-affected areas participated to a lesser extent and the modernization gaps widened during the crisis years. Local rice market conditions improved with better-quality rice sold locally. A large share of food vendors indicated better rice quality overall at the time of survey compared to 3 and 10 years earlier. Sixty-eight percent of vendors reported that there was no foreign matter in the rice that they sold a decade ago. That share has increased by 23 percentage points to 91 percent in 2022. In domestic retail, modern retail is (yet) negligible in rice distribution at the national level. Rice exports quadrupled, with Myanmar becoming globally the 5th biggest exporter of rice by the end of 2019. Rice exports have proven to be resilient during the crisis years. Rice exports increased dramatically despite more stringent, and costly, non-tariff measures for exports such as phyto-sanitary requirements. Rice is exported through different channels, moving away from low-quality rice trucked to China, to relatively better-quality and often certified rice being shipped on large vessels to a more diverse set of countries. We see shifting challenges over time – due to banking, electricity, and mobility problems that millers and traders adjusted to, at an increasing cost – but national exports mostly stabilized, in the crisis years compared to the period before, seemingly as major rice producing areas - except Sagaing - were less affected by conflicts, Midstream, we see rapid uptake and investments in modern drying machines – especially mechanized dryers – and modern milling machinery in the form of new mill starts and upgrading from traditional mills. The average number of modern mills operating in the miller’s same village tract/ward increased by about 60 percent from 2013 to 2019 and by a further 10 percent in 2022. The trend for traditional mills is the opposite: declining by 50 percent between 2013 and 2019 and a further 15 percent in 2022. This modernization has been driven by local firm investments as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been limited. Upstream (at the farm level), we note a substantial expansion of modern input use. Rice seed markets have become more active in the 2010s. The sale of branded rice seeds doubled over the last decade. Chemical fertilizer use also increased over the last decade. While use was lower in 2022 than before the crisis, they were still at a higher level than a decade earlier. We also see increased use of modern harvest and post-harvest technologies and more outsourcing of harvest and post-harvest activities, mostly linked to these modern technologies and practices. In 2022, 54 percent of the farmers reported to have used a combine-harvester on most rice plots. Farmers hiring in tractors increased by 33 percentage points over the last decade. Outsourcing drying services has also increased, but the growth has been more modest: 22 percent of the farmers indicated that they outsourced the drying of paddy. Modern dryer use increased accordingly. We find significant negative relationships between severe local conflict and many modernization outcomes. Severe conflict is found to negatively impact various modernization aspects, notably the adoption of tractor services and modern dryers at the farm level, and the prevalence of modern mills and drying equipment in midstream operations. Modernization has not been everywhere inclusive. More remote and smaller firms are participating less in modern practices. More remote farmers show smaller growth in adoption of combine harvesters, modern dryers, and modern mills, while smaller farmers have smaller growth in the use of combine harvesters and drying service providers. In the midstream, mills in remote areas show smaller changes in the share of modern mills in their areas, while smaller mills have significantly slower growth in modern service provision and lower investment rates in value-added machinery. For many of these modernization outcomes, the gaps across firm size and remoteness widened during the crisis years. Our findings point to three main implications for the modernization of Myanmar’s rice VC. Private-market oriented reform leads to rapid modernization in VCs, while heavy intervention – e.g., low reference prices for rice; limits on intranational trade; control of imports and exports through an export licensing system; and currency manipulation through a dual exchange rate system – may jeopardize VC modernization and increase uncertainty throughout VCs. More inclusive transformation should be promoted. Smaller and more remote farms and mills are showing slower growth across many modernization outcomes, raising concerns about livelihood improvements for those participating less in the VC’s modernization. Conflict negatively affects modernization at the farm and VC midstream. The study reaffirms the crucial need for stable political and economic environments to foster effective agricultural growth and transformation.

The social protection system in Myanmar has remained at a rudimentary level for the past decade, with policies scattered and fragmented across various government departments, and serving only a fraction of the eligible population. The government allocated only 0.8 percent of its expenditure to social protection constraining its ability to expand to vulnerable groups leaving households to rely on informal forms of safety nets against idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, and life-course contingencies (Niño-Zarazúa & Tarp 2021). Only 13.8 percent of the population received any form of social protection according to the 2017 MLCS, leaving much of the poor, which is about one-third of the population, out of the scope of protection. After the military takeover in 2021, government provision of social protection faced a complete collapse with near zero allocation to the population (MAPSA 2022c). In the face of the double predicament of the COVID-19 pandemic and coup, any form of anti-poverty investment should effectively target the poor based on observable and verifiable characteristics. In this research note, we explore some promising indicators which can be used by implementing agencies to effectively target the poor. We use data from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS) collected over the phone during July and August of 2022. The survey was conducted among 12,000 households in 310 townships of Myanmar. The MHWS is a nationally, urban/rural and state/region representative phone survey (MAPSA 2022a). The household survey questionnaire collected information on a wide variety of topics such as household composition, occupation, education, dwelling characteristics, assets, income, and agriculture.

This decade has been marked by multiple, often overlapping, crises. The COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters, and the ongoing war in Ukraine have all threatened the fabric of our global food systems. But opportunities can be found amid crises, and the world’s food systems have demonstrated surprising resilience. With new evidence on what works, now is the time to rethink how we address food crises. Better prediction, preparation, and resilience building can make future crises less common and less devastating, and improved responses can contribute to greater food security, better nutrition, and sustainable livelihoods.

Subjective well-being measures are increasingly applied in quantitative economic analyses intended to elicit non-monetary wellbeing of individuals. However, the subjective nature of this evaluation means that measurement and comparison may be confounded by differences in context or may be sensitive to the implementation modality. We use two rounds of a large-scale panel phone survey data from Myanmar to explore whether the randomized placement of a happiness module – either at the beginning or at the end of the survey – affects respondents’ answers. Respondents who were asked the happiness module at the end are more likely to be happy – an increase of 7 percentage points – compared to those who are asked at the beginning of the survey. This result is consistent using different models and robust to inclusion of enumerator fixed effects and other enumerator and survey characteristics. A related question on worry in the same module yields similar findings. Results also sustain over the two rounds of survey in which we conducted the experiment.

Nearly one-quarter of the global population lives in fragile states. Yet, despite the enormous importance of these areas for reducing global poverty and food insecurity, there is relatively little research examining how agricultural value chains, crucial for assuring food security, respond and adapt to such contexts. This paper analyzes Myanmar’s rice value chain–its most important staple crop and largest value chain–during the economic collapse and political instability caused by a military coup in early 2021. It relies on unique data collected with a large sample of rice retailers and millers before and after the coup. Despite many challenges in the rice value chain after the coup, such as banking and transport, rice processing and trade continued, assuring availability of rice in most retail markets and illustrating the resilience of the value chain to a major shock. While processing margins were mostly stable, an increased distribution margin (between rice millers and retailers) led to 11 percent higher average retail prices after the coup, implying welfare costs of almost USD 500 million. Using a market-pair regression method, we find that localized violence near sellers and buyers, distances traveled, and distance of vendors from international borders are associated with significantly increased rice price dispersion between rice retailers and mills. Despite the amalgam of problems to address in such settings, prioritizing the easing of transport restrictions, stabilizing fuel prices, and facilitating safe spatial arbitrage of food products would likely help prevent further food price inflation, assure higher farm prices, and improve welfare.