This 2004 book aims at advancing our understanding of the influences international norms and international institutions have over the incentives of states to cooperate on issues such as environment and trade. Contributors adopt two different approaches in examining this question. One approach focuses on the constitutive elements of the international legal order, including customary international law, soft law and framework conventions, and on the types of incentives states have, such as domestic incentives and reputation. The other approach examines specific issues in the areas of international environment protection and international trade. The combined outcome of these two approaches is an understanding of the forces that pull states toward closer cooperation or prevent them from doing so, and the impact of different types of international norms and diverse institutions on the motivation of states. The insights gained suggest ways for enhancing states' incentives to cooperate through the design of norms and institutions.

This book explores a new way of thinking about diplomacy, warfare, trade, and collective goods that begins with the notion that key international actors project their domestic institutions onto the regional or global arena. Exploring the emergence, consolidation, and decay of international norms, the author puts forward a general argument designed to identify patterns across time and space, combining key insights from constructivist, liberal, classical realist, English School, and feminist thinking. By moving from institution to institution, each chapter presents a coherent story ranging from antiquity to the contemporary world allowing us to see not only the patterns, but also to begin to develop conjectures about other causal stories implicit in the narrative. The book will be used by scholars and students of international relations, international organization and law, security studies, political economy, historical sociology, regionalism, and a wide range of specific topics such as arms control, trade, migration, identity, and collective goods.

DIVExamines how international organizations are used as a means of bypassing domestic opposition to policy change /div

The proliferation of international institutions and their impact has become a central issue in international relations. Why do countries comply with international agreements and how do international institutions influence national policies? Most theories focus on the extent to which international institutions can wield 'carrots and sticks' directly in their relations with states. Xinyuan Dai presents an alternative framework in which they influence national policies indirectly by utilizing non-state actors (NGOs, social movements) and empowering domestic constituencies. In this way, even weak international institutions that lack 'carrots and sticks' may have powerful effects on states. Supported by empirical studies of environmental politics, human rights and economic and security issues, this book sheds fresh light on how and why international institutions matter. It will be of interest to students, scholars and policymakers in both international relations and international law.

Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. While the decline in protectionism since World War II has stemmed partly from unilateral changes in trade policy by countries, it also has been a result of agreements among countries to liberalize their trade policies. International trade agreements and especially the GATT (now the WTO) have played an important role in this liberalization process. This paper analyzes the conditions under which states have concluded such agreements to lower their trade barriers and joined such international institutions. More generally, it explores the domestic factors affecting international economic cooperation.

This book explores how international organizations (IOs) have expanded their powers over time without formally amending their founding treaties. IOs intervene in military, financial, economic, political, social, and cultural affairs, and increasingly take on roles not explicitly assigned to them by law. Sinclair contends that this 'mission creep' has allowed IOs to intervene internationally in a way that has allowed them to recast institutions within and interactions among states, societies, and peoples on a broadly Western, liberal model. Adopting a historical and interdisciplinary, socio-legal approach, Sinclair supports this claim through detailed investigations of historical episodes involving three very different organizations: the International Labour Organization in the interwar period; the United Nations in the two decades following the Second World War; and the World Bank from the 1950s through to the 1990s. The book draws on a wide range of original institutional and archival materials, bringing to light little-known aspects of each organization's activities, identifying continuities in the ideas and practices of international governance across the twentieth century, and speaking to a range of pressing theoretical questions in present-day international law and international relations.