Dollar hegemony is a defining structural feature of the modern international financial order, and it confers significant economic and political privileges on the US. This book explores the political economic foundations of and prospects for dollar hegemony.

The book traces the origins of US hegemony from the planning conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in the late 1930s to the implementation of strategies for US dominance at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, where the US dollar was installed as the world's reserve currency. The book demonstrates how the US dollar's reserve currency status underpinned the economic primacy and power of the United States in the post-war period. It highlights the importance of the 1974 deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia to exchange US dollars for Saudi oil. It also examines the debate about the future of the US dollar's status within the global financial system.

This book showcases written dialogue from Brendan Brown and Philippe Simonnot on the subject of European monetary turmoil past and present and what hope there could be for future reform. Starting with the collapse of the gold standard in 1914, proceeding to the brief gold-dollar standard of the mid inter-war years, on to the collapse of Bretton Woods and the heyday of the Deutsche mark and ultimately discussing the euro, this book looks at a broad range of financial history alongside many new and provoking hypotheses about the devastating monetary turbulence of the successive eras, always with a focus on the US monetary hegemon. A highlight of the dialogue is an exploration of how past and future crises could combine to give birth to sound money in Europe – the launch, in effect, of a new euro. In the questions and answers within these pages, the authors draw on global examples and the challenges for Europe in deciding how to adapt to successive monetary shocks from the US, crafting a book that would be of interest to general finance and economics readers alongside students, researchers, and policymakers.

It is, as a critic of U.S.

This thesis analyzes the current disputes between the United States and China over the exchange rate of the Chinese currency renminbi using an International Political Economy (IPE) analysis. Monetary relations are not mere economic affairs, but bear geopolitical implications. Money is power. Money is politics. The pursuit of monetary power is an important part of great power politics. Based on this assertion, the thesis studies past cases of monetary power struggles between the United States and the Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the European Union (EU), respectively. The thesis then investigates the dollar's status as the dominant international reserve currency in the current international monetary system, as well as the power that this unique status can generate and provide. The dollar's monetary hegemony has become the main characteristic of the current international monetary system and an important power source for continued U.S. hegemony. The dollar's hegemony and the asymmetrical interdependency between the dollar and the renminbi are the source and the key basis for the recent U.S.-China monetary disagreements. The U.S.-China monetary disputes reflect not only each country's respective domestic interests and perceived benefits, but also the monetary power struggle between the two biggest global economies. Predictions are also entertained for the future monetary relations between the two countries, as well as the geopolitical implications that this relationship may have for the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in coming decades.

Between 1973 and 1980, the cost of crude oil rose suddenly and dramatically, precipitating convulsions in international politics. Conventional wisdom holds that international capital markets adjusted automatically and remarkably well: enormous amounts of money flowed into oil-rich states, and efficient markets then placed that new money in cash-poor Third World economies. David Spiro has followed the money trail, and the story he tells contradicts the accepted beliefs. Most of the sudden flush of new oil wealth didn't go to poor oil-importing countries around the globe. Instead, the United States made a deal with Saudi Arabia to sell it U.S. securities in secret, a deal resulting in a substantial portion of Saudi assets being held by the U.S. government. With this arrangement, the U.S. government violated its agreements with allies in the developed world. Spiro argues that American policymakers took this action to prop up otherwise intolerable levels of U.S. public debt. In effect, recycled OPEC wealth subsidized the debt-happy policies of the U.S. government as well as the debt-happy consumption of its citizenry.