Fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists explore the challenges to moral and religious belief posed by disagreement and evolution. The collection represents both sceptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion, cultivates new insights, and moves the discussion forward in illuminating ways.

In the dominant view, morality is more rational and universal than, and therefore independent from, (christian) religion. Believers do not have exclusive moral knowledge. Moral principles can be known by anyone. Morality, not religion, is the supreme judge of human actions in the world. Some contributors to this volume defend this view on theological and philosophical grounds. The advantages of such a view for thinking about a common global morality are clear. However, according to many authors, the conception of morality underlying this view is at the least, impoverished, if not wrong: this view cannot explain the importance and the persistence of moral taboos. Furthermore, every morality is influenced by metaphysical and anthropological assumptions - whether or not religious: the so-called modern, rational, secular morality. The central moral question in the alternative narrative concept of morality is 'Who am I / who do I want to be ?' and not 'What is the right action ?' In this approach, not universal principles, but tradition-dependant stories constitute the core of a morality. Are these concepts more adequate for understanding the relation of religion to morality ? Do they have room for the project of a universal morality of human rights ?

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.

A common refrain against atheism and secular humanism is that without belief in God, "everything is permitted." Walter Sinnott-Armstrong dismantles this argument and argues instead that God is not only not essential to morality, but that our moral behavior should be seen as utterly independent of religion. This short, accessible book is on a major aspect of the arguments against atheism and will interest those intrigued by the "new atheism" (Harris, Dawkins, etc).

This book draws together leaders in science, the health sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences to investigate the role of religion, its meaning and relevance, for their area of specialization. It provides a much-needed fresh perspective on the way in which religion operates within the modern, neo-liberal world. The book approaches the topic by way of a critical engagement between religion, broadly defined, and the individual disciplines in which each of the contributors is expert. Rather than simply taking the dogmatic position that religion offers something to every possible discipline, each of the chapters in this collection addresses the question: is there something that religion can offer to the discipline in question? That is the value of the book – it takes a truly critical stance on the place of religion in contemporary society.

Do you think of atheists as immoral pessimists who live their lives without meaning, purpose, or values? Think again! Atheism: A Very Short Introduction sets out to dispel the myths that surround atheism and show how a life without religious belief can be positive, meaningful, and moral.