In 1996, the IMF and the World Bank introduced the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative—a comprehensive debt relief program aimed at reducing the external debt burden of eligible countries to sustainable levels, provided they carry out strong programs of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms designed to promote growth and reduce poverty. Now that the HIPC Initiative is nearly completed, this paper investigates whether the initiative managed to spur growth, either directly or indirectly through investment. In contrast to earlier studies, we conclude that there is some evidence of positive effects of the HIPC Initiative on growth. Such evidence suggests that the HIPC Initiative and MDRI have helped HIPC-eligible countries to reach higher growth, but it remains unclear whether this is through higher investment or another channel. Also, the analysis illustrates that it is hard to disentangle pure debt-relief effects from other concurrent factors.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

The debt problems of poor countries are receiving unprecedented attention. Both federal and non-governmental organizations alike have been campaigning for debt forgiveness for poor countries. The governments of creditor nations responded to that challenge at a meeting sponsored by the G-7, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, all of which upgraded debt relief as a policy priority. Their initiatives provided for generous interpretations of these nations' abilities to sustain debt, gave them opportunities to qualify for debt relief more rapidly, and linked debt relief to broader policies of poverty reduction. Despite this, the crisis has only deepened in the first years of the new millennium. This brilliant group of contributions assesses why this has occurred. In plain language, it considers why debt relief has been so long in coming for poor countries. It evaluates the cost of a persistent overhang in debt for those countries. It also examines, head on, whether enhanced debt relief initiatives offer a permanent exit from over-indebtedness, or are merely a short-term respite. Above all, this volume for the first time addresses the issues on the ground: that is, the views and opinions about debt relief on the part of leaders in advanced nations, and the probability of further support for the most impoverished lands. In this approach, the editors and contributors have made an explicit and successful attempt to be inclusive and relevant at all stages of the analysis. This volume covers the full range of the poorest countries, with contributions by John Serieux, Lykke Anderson and Osvaldo Nina, Befekadu Degefe, Ligia Maria Castro-Monge, and Peter B. Mijumbi. Collectively, they offer a sobering scenario: unless measures are put in place now, in anticipation of further crises, the future of the very poorest nations will remain bleak and troublesome.

The low-income country debt crisis had its origins in weak macroeconomic policies, and official creditors’ willingness to take risks unacceptable to private lenders. Payments problems were initially addressed through nonconcessional reschedulings and new lending that maximized financing while containing the budgetary costs for creditors. This led to an unsustainable buildup in debt stocks. More recently, debt ratios have improved, reflecting both adjustment and substantial debt relief. The paper estimates debt relief initiatives since 1988 have cost creditors at least $30 billion, and possibly much more. This compares with the estimated costs of about $27 billion under the enhanced HIPC Initiative.

This paper investigates the short-term effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity in OECD economies. We examine the historical record, including Budget Speeches and IMFdocuments, to identify changes in fiscal policy motivated by a desire to reduce the budget deficit and not by responding to prospective economic conditions. Using this new dataset, our estimates suggest fiscal consolidation has contractionary effects on private domestic demand and GDP. By contrast, estimates based on conventional measures of the fiscal policy stance used in the literature support the expansionary fiscal contractions hypothesis but appear to be biased toward overstating expansionary effects.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

This book, edited by Jacob A. Frenkel, Michael P. Dooley, and Peter Wickham, presents a sample of the work of the IMF and that of world-renowned scholars on the analytical issues surrounding the explosion of countries with debt-servicing difficulties and describes debt initiatives and debt-reduction techniques that hold the best promise for finding a lasting solution to the problems of debtor countries.