We examine China's June 2013 liquidity crunch as a negative shock to banks and analyze the wealth effects on exchange-listed firms. Our findings suggest that liquidity shocks to financial institutions negatively impact borrower performance, particularly borrowers reporting outstanding loans at the end of 2012. Stock valuations of firms with long-term bank relationships, however, outperform the market and experience smaller subsequent declines in investment than peers lacking solid banking relationships. This effect is the strongest for firms that enjoy good relations with China's large state-owned banks or foreign banks, and weakest for firms whose connections are solely with local banks. We document a positive correlation between the stock performances of firms and the stock performances of lender banks and the likelihood of lender banks operating as net lenders in the interbank market. These results suggest that banks transmit liquidity shocks to their borrowing firms and that a long-term bank-firm relationship may mitigate the negative effects of a liquidity shock.

We exploit a liquidity crunch of 2013 in China as a negative shock to banks and analyze the wealth effects on listed firms. Our findings show that liquidity shocks to financial institutions impact borrowers' performance negatively. However, firms having long-term relationship with banks outperformed in stock market and subsequently experiecend a smaller decline in cash holding than their peers without such relationship. This effect is the strongest for firms whose relationship banks are foreign banks, and the weakest for firms whose relationship banks are local banks. We also document a positive correlation between firms' stock performances and their banks' stock performances, as well as banks' liquidity in the interbank market. These results suggest that banks transmit liquidity shocks to their borrowing firms and that the long-term bank-firm relationship can mitigate such negative effcts.

Global banks played a significant role in transmitting the 2007-09 financial crisis to emerging-market (EM) economies. The authors examine adverse liquidity shocks on main developed-country banking systems and their relationships to EM across Europe, Asia, and Latin Amer., isolating loan supply from loan demand effects. Loan supply in EM across Europe, Asia, and Latin Amer. was affected significantly through three separate channels: (1) a contraction in direct, cross-border lending by foreign banks; (2) a contraction in local lending by foreign banks¿ affiliates in EM; and (3) a contraction in loan supply by domestic banks, resulting from the funding shock to their balance sheets induced by the decline in interbank, cross-border lending. Charts and tables.

Many long-held views about the global financial system and the effectiveness of monetary policy have been questioned since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/2009. At stake is the capacity of monetary authorities to isolate international monetary policy shocks under financial globalization coupled with the rapid development of shadow banking and its impact on the banking system and monetary policy transmission. This thesis comprises three empirical studies to examine these issues by providing evidence from China. The first study investigates the international transmission of monetary policy from the U.S. to China. The results show that the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy are significant and strong on China's short-term interest rates after the GFC. The spillover at the long-end of the yield curve even holds before the GFC, but only for positive changes in U.S. long-term interest rates. By comparing the results with countries under flexible exchange rates such as New Zealand, I find a fixed exchange rate regime with capital controls helps to mitigate more effectively external monetary shocks especially during a turmoil period. The second study shifts the focus on the driving forces of the rise of shadow banking in China. Aside from micro arbitrage factors suggested by previous literature, I paid specific attention to a wide range of macro-finance factors. To reflect the unique institutional features that shape macroeconomic policy making in China, I introduce a novel identification strategy to isolate pure monetary policy shocks from the influence of other macroeconomic policy variations. The empirical results show robustly that China's shadow banking is essentially driven by macro-policy factors including credit scale tightening, strengthened risky-loan regulation, and intensified interest-rate repression. In contrast, the effect of a pure monetary contraction is to reduce shadow banking, due to an economy-wide tightening of liquidity. The third essay investigates how shadow banking impacts loan pricing and the pass-through from policy rates to retail lending rates. The results show that the yield of shadow banking products impacts the lending rates positively, in which 20 percent of the impact takes effect through the deposit channel. The scale of shadow banking wealth management products (WMPs) does not significantly impact lending rates. Furthermore, the rise in shadow banking appears to have decreased the pass-through from benchmark policy rates to lending rates after 2013 by providing alternative credit options to bank loans, supporting the loan-demand side view. On the other hand, I find the effect of shadow banking on the pass-through from market-based short-term policy rates to lending rates became insignificant after 2013 as the arbitrage model shifted from the WMP-channel-shadow credit to interbank-entrustment-securities. However, China's shadow banking appears to have significantly decreased net interest margins of banks after 2013 as the average return on financial securities invested by shadow banking is lower than on-balance loan yields.

We study the impact of bank credit on firm productivity. We exploit a matched firm-bank database covering all the credit relationships of Italian corporations, together with a natural experiment, to measure idiosyncratic supply-side shocks to credit availability and to estimate a production model augmented with financial frictions. We find that a contraction in credit supply causes a reduction of firm TFP growth and also harms IT-adoption, innovation, exporting, and adoption of superior management practices, while a credit expansion has limited impact. Quantitatively, the credit contraction between 2007 and 2009 accounts for about a quarter of observed the decline in TFP.

Using a regulatory dataset of foreign bank branches in Hong Kong, this study finds evidence of the international transmission of funding shocks from home countries of global banks through their internal capital markets during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Global banks are found to buffer parent-bank liquidity shocks by repatriating cross-border internal funding, leading to reductions in loan supply by branches in Hong Kong. Branches with a higher loan-to-asset ratio are estimated to cut loan supply sharper than their counterparts. More liquid assets held by parent banks and central bank liquidity are found to reduce the extent of shock transmission significantly.

Using business registry data from China, we show that internal capital markets in business groups can propagate corporate shareholders’ credit supply shocks to their subsidiaries. An average of 16.7% local bank credit growth where corporate shareholders are located would increase subsidiaries investment by 1% of their tangible fixed asset value, which accounts for 71% (7%) of the median (average) investment rate among these firms. We argue that equity exchanges is one channel through which corporate shareholders transmit bank credit supply shocks to the subsidiaries and provide empirical evidence to support the channel.