In this paper we conjecture that the weak association between disclosure and cost of equity capital found in the literature (Botosan, 1997) can be caused by the high level corporate disclosure environment found in the US. We hypothesize that in low level corporate disclosure environments the variability in disclosure practices across firms will be larger than in the US and consequently the marginal effect of voluntary disclosure policies will be higher. Using a newly developed Brazilian Corporate Disclosure Index (BCDI) our results confirm this hypothesis. Disclosure is strongly associated with ex ante cost of equity capital for Brazilian firms. The results are more pronounced for firms with less analyst coverage and low ownership concentration as expected.

The study analysed the relationship between accounting disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary, on the cost of equity capital for listed companies in the Egyptian exchange. The focus is on analysing this relationship in one of the emerging capital markets where there is a paucity of research analysing this issue. To achieve this aim, two self-constructed disclosure indices for mandatory and voluntary disclosure were used to measure the level of disclosure in Egypt. The cost of equity capital was measured based on three methods identified in the literature, namely the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama-French three factor model, and the industrial earnings-price ratio. To analyse the effect of accounting disclosure on the cost of equity capital, each of the cost of equity measurement methods was regressed on mandatory and voluntary disclosure scores, alternatively, and some controls that are identified in the literature to affect the association between the two variables. The control variables used were firm size, leverage, book-to-market ratio, profitability, liquidity, and sales growth. As a robustness check, a composite measure of the three cost of equity methods was used and the effect of the control variables was excluded from the analyses. To control for the existent endogeneity in the explanatory variable, accounting disclosure, a dynamic panel system of the generalized method of moments (SGMM) was used in the regression analyses. Using a sample of 657 firm year observations for 73 firms across 11 industries for nine years from 2008 to 2016, the study found a significant negative association between voluntary disclosure level and cost of equity capital, however, the study found a significant positive association between mandatory disclosure level and cost of equity capital. The results of the study could benefit various parties including researchers, regulators, and investors. It provides a motivation to researchers interested in analysing this association in Egypt and other emerging markets besides providing these researchers with a suitable data set to measure disclosure and cost of equity capital in Egypt. Regulators could benefit from the results of the study through identifying the shortcomings that need to be overcome to improve the disclosure environment in Egypt. Investors could use the results of the study as a data source in making investment decisions in Egypt.

This paper examines the effects of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital in Asia's emerging markets with newly released surveys from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). We find that both disclosure and non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms have a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital. In addition, the effect of non-disclosure governance mechanisms is more profound than that of disclosure on the cost of equity capital. Specifically, after controlling for beta and size, when a firm improves its aggregate non-disclosure corporate governance ranking from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, its cost of equity capital is reduced roughly by 1.26 percentage points, while the corresponding reduction in the cost of equity capital for the same improvement in disclosure is 0.47. Finally, we find that country-level investor protection and firm-level corporate governance are both important in reducing the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that, in emerging markets where infrastructural factors, such as the legal protection of investors and the overall level of corporate governance, are not well established, reducing the expropriation risk by strengthening overall corporate governance appears to be more important in reducing the cost of equity capital than adopting a more forthright disclosure policy.

This paper examines the direct effect of internal control quality (ICQ) on cost of equity capital and whether the former has a moderating effect on the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of equity capital in an emerging market (Egypt). ICQ is measured using a survey of external auditors. A content analysis approach is used to proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure in annual. Finally, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework is used to estimate cost of equity capital. Based on a sample of 256 firm-year observations over the period of 2007-2010, we find that ICQ is negatively and significantly associated with cost of equity capital indicating that better controls reduce cost of capital. In addition, ICQ moderates the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of equity capital since this association is only negative and significant for companies characterized by high ICQ. Our study contributes to the internal control literature by focusing on an emergent unregulated market with respect to internal control disclosure and documents that ICQ plays an important role in reducing cost of equity capital (either directly or indirectly) by increasing the value relevance of voluntary disclosure among investors on the Egyptian stock exchange.

This monograph reviews the existing accounting, finance and economics literature on the economic effects of transparency in international equity markets, considers aspects of an international setting that make it an interesting environment for investigating these effects, and suggests directions for future research

Emerging market stock issuance relative to GDP rose in the late twentieth century to levels that roughly matched that of advanced, industrial markets. Nonetheless, the connection between owning shares of emerging market stock and the ability to influence the management of these firms remains fundamentally different from the analogous institutional connection that has evolved in industrial markets. The reasons for the differences in emerging markets are both historical and political in nature. That is, local equity markets have had the objective of providing for some degree of local ownership and control of large economic entities since the late nineteenth century. However, local markets have operated under different global political structures since that time, ranging from imperialism, to world wars, to sovereign developmental states, to neo-liberal states. Shares issued under these different structures have been reconfigured over time, resulting in a lack of convergence along either the Anglo-American or Continental models of corporate governance. The author uses a political science paradigm to explain the growth of emerging equity markets. She departs from conventional economic explanations and examines politics at the micro-level of large issues of emerging market stock. The second half of the book presents case studies dealing with emerging market countries in Latin America, Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The case studies connect the regional, state, and firm levels to detail the multiple ownership and control arrangements, and to dispel the notion that mere quantitative growth of these markets will lead to a convergence in financial institutional structures along the lines of the industrial core of the world economy.