Since the beginning of modern warfare, one of the favorite crusades of the international peacemakers has been toward disarmament. This book investigates the British origin of the disarmament idea--from World War I through the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. It traces the development of disarmament as a war aim, with special reference to the influence of British Liberal thought, and President Wilson's acceptance of disarmament as one of his Fourteen Points. Disarmament is related to the other Allied war aims and to theLiberal and Labor parties during the war period. Particular attention is paid to the influence of public opinion and the British press. Neither an attack on nor an apology for the fiasco which followed, this is a lucid analysis of the events, tensions, personalities, and self-interests which led to the failure of an ideal.

Lawyer, politician, diplomat and leading architect of the League of Nations; Robert Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, was one of Britain's most significant statesmen of the twentieth century. His views on international diplomacy cover the most important aspects of British, European and American foreign policy concerns of the century, including the origins and consequences of the two world wars, the disarmament movement, the origins and early course of the Cold War and the first steps towards European integration. His experience of the First World War and the huge loss of life it entailed provoked Cecil to spend his life championing the ethos behind and work of the League of Nations: a role for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937. Yet despite his prominence in the international peace movement, Cecil has never been the focus of an academic biography. Cecil has perhaps been judged unfairly due to his association with the League of Nations, which has since been generally regarded as a failure. However, recent academic research has highlighted the contribution of the League to the creation of many of the institutions and precepts that have, since the Second World War, become accepted parts of the international system, not least the United Nations. In particular, Cecil and his work on arms control lay the basis for understanding this new area of international activity, which would bear fruit during the Cold War and after. Through an evaluation of Cecil's political career, the book also assesses his reputation as an idealist and the extent to which he had a coherent philosophy of international relations. This book suggests that in reality Cecil was a Realpolitiker pragmatist whose attitudes evolved during two key periods: the interwar period and the Cold War. It also proposes that where a coherent philosophy was in evidence, it owed as much to the moral and political code of the Cecil family as to his own experiences in politics. Cecil's social and familial world is therefore considered alongside his more public life.

The book investigates the role of popular liberal internationalism as a social movement in Britain using Gramscian and Foucauldian ideas of civil society. It addresses the use of force for peace through an examination of the impact of civil society actors in popular liberal internationalism between the world wars.

This collection examines various aspects of the efforts made to limit warfare through arms limitation and disarmament agreements in the period from the first Hague conference to the outbreak of World War II in Europe. The issue for each contributor is not necessarily to show whether individual endeavors, separate conferences, and the rest were successful or unsuccessful--though this is an important consideration. Rather, each chapter tends to offer differing points of view on accomplishments and failures because, as is so often the experience in historical study, the record is mixed; and this situation is certainly no less characteristic of arms limitation and disarmament between 1899 and 1939. Written by experts on disarmament issues, these chapters put into historical perspective how and why the effort, to restrain war were undertaken at the Hague conferences, the Washington conference, and among antiwar groups. Each contributor approaches this task using the method he or she deems most appropriate. Some employ an historiographical approach; others undertake to produce analyses based heavily on archival holdings in order to offer new interpretations of the past or revise existing ones. This book will be of interest to students and teachers alike of modern history and political science.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1975.

The twenty-five year period following the Second World War saw an enormous expansion of activity in the writing of the history of modern Britain, and with that expansion a major transformation of the state of knowledge in many parts of the area. First published in 1970, this Revivals reissue, which includes an extensive coverage of books and a reasonable selection of articles, endeavours both to survey the work done and to reduce it to some comprehensible order. It indicates achievements and probable lines of development, and collects the materials that have grown around the main controversies. Omitted are local history (in the main) and the history of empire and commonwealth, except where the latter really arises out of the affairs of the mother country. There are special sections on social history, the history of ideas, Scotland and Ireland.

How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914—but shaped Britain’s success in the Second World War and beyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854–1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914–18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill’s conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett’s ideas continue to influence British thinking.