A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.

Local uniqueness and smooth dependence of the endogenous variables from the exogenous ones are studied using a version of a so-called parametric transversality theorem. In a standard general equilibrium model, all equilibria are efficient, but that is not the case if some imperfection, like incomplete markets, asymmetric information, strategic interaction, is added. Then, for almost all economies, equilibria are inefficient, and an outside institution can Pareto improve upon the market outcome. Those results are proved showing that a well-chosen system of equations has no solutions."

This is the first economics work of its kind offering the economist the opportunity to acquire new and important analytical tools. It introduces the reader to three advanced mathematical methods by presenting both their theoretical bases and their applications to a wide range of economic models. The mathematical methods presented are ordinary differential equations, stability techniques and chaotic dynamics. Topics such as existence, continuation of solutions, uniqueness, dependence on initial data and parameters, linear systems, stability of linear systems, two dimensional phase analysis, local and global stability, the stability manifold, stability of optimal control and empirical tests for chaotic dynamics are covered and their use in economic theory is illustrated in numerous applications. These applications include microeconomic dynamics, investment theory, macroeconomic policies, capital theory, business cycles, financial economics and many others. All chapters conclude with two sections on miscellaneous applications and exercises and further remarks and references. In total the reader will find a valuable guide to over 500 selected references that use differential equations, stability analysis and chaotic dynamics. Graduate students in economics with a special interest in economic theory, economic researchers and applied mathematicians will all benefit from this volume.

Although the application of differential equations to economics is a vast and vibrant area, the subject has not been systematically studied; it is often treated as a subsidiary part of mathematical economics textbooks. This book aims to fill that void by providing a unique blend of the theory of differential equations and their exciting applications to dynamic economics. Containing not just a comprehensive introduction to the applications of the theory of linear (and linearized) differential equations to economic analysis, the book also studies nonlinear dynamical systems, which have only been widely applied to economic analysis in recent years. It provides comprehensive coverage of the most important concepts and theorems in the theory of differential equations in a way that can be understood by any reader who has a basic knowledge of calculus and linear algebra. In addition to traditional applications of the theory to economic dynamics, the book includes many recent developments in different fields of economics.

Game theory has revolutionised our understanding of industrial organisation and the traditional theory of the firm. Despite these advances, industrial economists have tended to rely on a restricted set of tools from game theory, focusing on static and repeated games to analyse firm structure and behaviour. Luca Lambertini, a leading expert on the application of differential game theory to economics, argues that many dynamic phenomena in industrial organisation (such as monopoly, oligopoly, advertising, R&D races) can be better understood and analysed through the use of differential games. After illustrating the basic elements of the theory, Lambertini guides the reader through the main models, spanning from optimal control problems describing the behaviour of a monopolist through to oligopoly games in which firms' strategies include prices, quantities and investments. This approach will be of great value to students and researchers in economics and those interested in advanced applications of game theory.

A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

This book critically analyses the World Trade Organization’s approach to "special and differential treatment" (SDT) to argue that it is founded on seeking exemptions from WTO obligations, instead of creating an enabling environment for developing countries to integrate fully into the multilateral trading system. Through six key sections: United States Proposal on Special and Differential Treatment Responses to United States Proposal The Evolution of Differential Treatment Failure of the Current Approach to Differential Treatment Complications Created by China’s Emergence in the Global Economy An Alternative Approach to Differential Treatment this book explores how, by adopting a new evidence-based, case-by-case approach to SDT, the development of the poorest countries can best be advanced, while at the same time ensuring that advanced developing countries carry their weight in the organization. It will be of interest to scholars and students of international trade law and political science, as well as trade practitioners such as lawyers, diplomats, and analysts.