Learn the differences between the two most commonly used parliamentary authorities, "Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised," and "American Institute of Parliamentarians Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure."

Cannon's handbook on parliamentary procedure is user friendly for the inexperienced and an invaluable guide for the veteran presiding officer. His method for holding effective meetings is based not on the traditional, bewildering accumulation of particulars and exceptions, but on common sense, logic, good communication and fairness all within the bylaws and rules of any organization as well as traditional procedure. A professional parliamentarian since 1965, Hugh Cannon has guided meetings with as few as 30 and as many as 10,000 delegates. Now, with revealing and amusing anecdotes, he puts this extensive practical experience at the service of readers. His Card System,' for communication between a parliamentarian and the Chair, was first introduced in this handbook, and now is presented as a workshop topic at many national conferences for parliamentarians. The section of the handbook devoted only to rules of procedure ( A Short Course in Parliamentary Procedure ) is a mercifully brief 70 pages, compared to the hundreds of pages in traditional procedure manuals. Yet these pages cover all that will ever come up in most local, state or national meetings. In simple, contemporary language the reader is provided a thorough and complete understanding of the rules of parliamentary procedure.

"A treasure trove of parliamentary knowledge and wisdom" (Lee Demeter, Advisory Council, American Institute of Parliamentarians), "Riddick's Rules of Procedure" is certain to be "accepted universally for its elimination of useless procedures, its streamlined innovations, and its understandable vocabulary" (Hermon W. Farwell, Editor, the "Parliamentary Journal").

The classic guide to meeting procedure—updated to meet the needs of today’s organizations For more than 60 years, American Institute of Parliamentarians Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure (formerly, the Sturgis Standard Code) has been helping meeting organizers and participants ensure fairness and justice on a consistent basis. This updated edition provides important new motions and protocols pertaining to electronic meetings, discipline, and finance and audit committees. “The Standard Code lays out the rules in a clear, concise, and readable format for all to use.” —former U.S. Senator Don Nickles “Meeting rules can be abstruse, even to the point of frustration to the average member in an organization. The Standard Code promises to keep the rules simple and understandable—and has delivered on its promise for more than sixty years.” —Robert Dove, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States Senate “Takes uncommon terminology and puts it in everyday terms for more clarity in meetings. The Standard Code is an important addition to any parliamentary library.” —Ronald R. Stinson, NAP President 2009-2011 “The meeting-attendee who picks this book up will not only become proficient in the use of the meeting rules, but will also learn the important democratic principles behind the rules.” —Congressman Mike Simpson (Idaho) “Comprehensive and easily understandable.” —Perry Opin, D.D.S., M.Sc.D., Speaker of the House of Delegates of the Connecticut State Dental Association

Originally published in 2007, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy. A work of major importance, it remains as relevant today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006. Mearsheimer and Walt describe in clear and bold terms the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel and argues that this support cannot be fully explained on either strategic or moral grounds. This exceptional relationship is due largely to the political influence of a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. They provocatively contend that the lobby has a far-reaching impact on America's posture throughout the Middle East―in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict―and the policies it has encouraged are in neither America's national interest nor Israel's long-term interest. The lobby's influence also affects America's relationship with important allies and increases dangers that all states face from global jihadist terror. The publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy led to a sea change in how the U.S-Israel relationship was discussed, and continues to be one of the most talked-about books in foreign policy.

A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.