In 1987–1988 was die stowwerige Angolese dorpie Cuito Cuanavale die toneel van die laaste gevegte van die Grensoorlog. Sedertdien is dit die fokuspunt van 'n openbare debat oor wie eintlik hierdie oorlog gewen het. Die leierskorps van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (SAW) hou vol hulle is nooit verslaan nie, terwyl die alliansie van die Angolese MPLA-regering, Kuba en Swapo beweer hulle het die SAW uit Angola en Suidwes-Afrika verdryf. Hulle glo voorts die SAW wou Cuito Cuanavale beset en as afspringplek gebruik om Luanda in te neem. Maar was Cuito Cuanavale ooit regtig 'n doelwit vir die Suid-Afrikaners? Dit is die vraag wat Leopold Scholtz vra wanneer hy onlangs gedeklassi-fiseerde dokumente in die weermagargief bestudeer en die taktiese en strategiese besluite ondersoek wat 'n bepalende rol in die ses groot veldslae van dié veldtog gespeel het. Sy kritiese ontleding wys hoe maklik propaganda en politiek in die pad van feite kan staan.

"A shooting war is often followed by a second war. This war is not fought with bullets or artillery shells, not with tanks or bombers, but rather with words. The war is, in effect, fought again on paper." In 1987–1988 the dusty Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale was the backdrop for the final battles of the Border War. Ever since the war ended, the fighting around Cuito has been the subject of a fierce public debate over who actually won the war. While the leadership of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) claims it was never defeated, the supporters of the Angolan MPLA government, Cuba and SWAPO insist that the SADF was vanquished on the battlefield. They contend that the SADF wanted to overrun Cuito Cuanavale and use it as a springboard for an advance on Luanda. But was Cuito Cuanavale ever really an objective of the SADF? Leopold Scholtz tackles this question by examining recently declassified documents in the SANDF archives, exploring the strategic and tactical decisions that shaped the six main battles, from the SADF's stunning tactical success on the Lomba River to the grinding struggle for the Tumpo Triangle. His incisive analysis untangles what happens when war, politics and propaganda become entwined.

A “gripping” story of the Angolan Civil War and how it evolved into a Cold War struggle between superpowers (New York Journal of Books). Lasting over a quarter of a century, from 1975 to 2002, the Angolan Civil War began as a power struggle between two former liberation movements, the MPLA and UNITA—but became a Cold War struggle with involvement from the Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, and the United States. This book examines the height of the Cuban-South African fighting in Angola in 1987–88, when three thousand South African soldiers and about eight thousand UNITA guerrilla fighters fought in alliance against the Cubans and the armed forces of the Marxist MPLA government, a force of over fifty thousand men. Fred Bridgland pieced together the course of the war, fought in one of the world’s most remote and wild terrains, by interviewing the South Africans who fought it, and many of their stories are woven into the narrative. This classic account of a Cold War struggle and its momentous consequences for the participants and the continent now includes a new preface and epilogue. “Highlights just how much political and social considerations dictate the outcome of war . . . A highly detailed work of military history, The War for Africa can tell us a lot about the nature of counter-insurgency warfare and how small states can become contested battlegrounds between superpowers.” —New York Journal of Books

South Africa?s armed forces invaded Angola in 1975, setting off a war that had consequences for the whole region that are still felt today. A Far-Away War contributes to a wider understanding of this war in Angola and Namibia. The book does not only look at the war from an ?old? South African (Defence Force) perspective, but also gives a voice to participants ?on the other side? ? emphasising the role of the Cubans and Russians. This focus is supplemented by the inclusion of many never-before-published photographs from Cuban and Russian archives, and a comprehensive bibliography.

Cuba, Africa, and Apartheid’s End: Africa's Children Return! examines the history and impressive dimensions of the Cuban Revolution’s solidarity with Africa. Cuba’s role in the southern African national liberation and anti-colonial struggle was the largest and most consequential manifestation of the island’s commitment to Africa. A key moment was the 1987–1988 battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which involved Cuba and Angola on one side, and South Africa and its allies on the other. Cuito Cuanavale contributed the end of apartheid and has assumed legendary status within the Cuban Revolution and the southern African liberation movement.

A South African national serviceman recounts becoming a soldier and an ensuing David-and-Goliath face-off against Angolan armed forces in 1987. The climactic death-throes of Soviet Communism during the 1980s included a last-gasp attempt at strategic franchise expansion in southern Africa. Channeled through Castro’s Cuba, oil-rich Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) received billions of dollars of advanced weaponry and thousands of armored vehicles. Their intent: to eradicate the US-backed Angolan opposition (UNITA), then push southwards into South Africa’s protectorate SWA/Namibia, ostensibly as liberators. 1985 saw the first large-scale mechanized offensive in southern African history. Russian Generals planned and oversaw the offensive but didn’t account for the tenacity of UNITA (supported by the South African Defense Forces, SADF) or the rainy season. The ‘85 offensive floundered in the mud, and FAPLA returned to their capital Luanda. The South Africans stood down, confident their “covert” support for UNITA had demonstrated the folly of prosecuting war so far from home against Africa’s military Superpower. However, they were mistaken. Fidel and FAPLA immediately redoubled their efforts, strengthening fifteen battalions with even more Soviet hardware while Russian and Cuban specialists oversaw troop training. As Cuban and Angolan fighter pilots honed their skills over the skies of Northern Angola, David Mannall, a normal seventeen-year-old kid completing high school, was preparing for two years of compulsory military service before beginning Tertiary education. Through a series of fateful twists, he found himself leading soldiers in several full-scale armored clashes, including the largest and most decisive battle on African soil since World War II. This is a David and Goliath story that has never been truthfully told. The author reveals how Charlie Squadron, comprising just twelve 90mm AFVs crewed by thirty-six national servicemen, as part of the elite sixty-one Mechanized Battalion, engaged and effectively annihilated the giant FAPLA 47th Armored Brigade in one day—3 October 1987. Their 90mm cannons were never designed as tank-killers, but any assurances that it would never be used against heavy armor were left in the classroom during the three-month operation and never more starkly than the decisive “Battle on The Lomba River.” The Communist-backed offensive died that day along with hundreds of opposition fighters. 47th Brigade survivors abandoned their remaining equipment, eventually joining the 59th Brigade in what became a full-scale retreat of over ten thousand soldiers to Cuito Cuanevale. The myth perpetuated by post-apartheid politicians goes something like this: “The SADF force that destroyed 47th Brigade on 3 October numbered 6,000 men and that all the hard yards were run by the long-suffering UNITA!” The inconvenient truth is that there were just 36 South African boys on the frontline that day, but it is also true to say they would never have achieved such a stunning victory without the support of many more. This is their story.