Giovanni Castellani Rector of the University of Venice This book contains the Proceedings of the Conference on "Economic Policy and Control Theory" which was held at the University of Venice (Italy) on 27 January-l February 1985. The goal of the Conference was to survey the main developments of control theory in economics, by emphasizing particularly new achievements in the analysis of dynamic economic models by con trol methods. The development of control theory is strictly related to the development of science and technology in the last forty years. Control theory was indeed applied mainly in engineering, and only in the sixties economists started using control methods for analys ing economic problems, even if some preliminary economic applica tions of calculus of variations, from which control theory was then developed, date back to the twenties. Applications of control theory in economics also had to solve new, complicated, problems, like those encountered in optimal growth models, or like the determination of the appropriate inter temporal social welfare function, of the policy horizon and the relative final state of the system, of the appropriate discount factor. Furthermore, the uncertainty characterizing economic models had to be taken into account, thus giving rise to the development of stochastic control theory in economics.

A rigorous introduction to optimal control theory, with an emphasis on applications in economics. This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary differential equations, optimal control, game theory, and mechanism design in one volume. Technically rigorous and largely self-contained, it provides an introduction to the use of optimal control theory for deterministic continuous-time systems in economics. The theory of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) is the backbone of the theory developed in the book, and chapter 2 offers a detailed review of basic concepts in the theory of ODEs, including the solution of systems of linear ODEs, state-space analysis, potential functions, and stability analysis. Following this, the book covers the main results of optimal control theory, in particular necessary and sufficient optimality conditions; game theory, with an emphasis on differential games; and the application of control-theoretic concepts to the design of economic mechanisms. Appendixes provide a mathematical review and full solutions to all end-of-chapter problems. The material is presented at three levels: single-person decision making; games, in which a group of decision makers interact strategically; and mechanism design, which is concerned with a designer's creation of an environment in which players interact to maximize the designer's objective. The book focuses on applications; the problems are an integral part of the text. It is intended for use as a textbook or reference for graduate students, teachers, and researchers interested in applications of control theory beyond its classical use in economic growth. The book will also appeal to readers interested in a modeling approach to certain practical problems involving dynamic continuous-time models.

Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis presents a modern and thorough exposition of the fundamental mathematical formalism used to study optimal control theory, i.e., continuous time dynamic economic processes, and to interpret dynamic economic behavior. The style of presentation, with its continual emphasis on the economic interpretation of mathematics and models, distinguishes it from several other excellent texts on the subject. This approach is aided dramatically by introducing the dynamic envelope theorem and the method of comparative dynamics early in the exposition. Accordingly, motivated and economically revealing proofs of the transversality conditions come about by use of the dynamic envelope theorem. Furthermore, such sequencing of the material naturally leads to the development of the primal-dual method of comparative dynamics and dynamic duality theory, two modern approaches used to tease out the empirical content of optimal control models. The stylistic approach ultimately draws attention to the empirical richness of optimal control theory, a feature missing in virtually all other textbooks of this type.

This book presents general methods for the design of economic model predictive control (EMPC) systems for broad classes of nonlinear systems that address key theoretical and practical considerations including recursive feasibility, closed-loop stability, closed-loop performance, and computational efficiency. Specifically, the book proposes: Lyapunov-based EMPC methods for nonlinear systems; two-tier EMPC architectures that are highly computationally efficient; and EMPC schemes handling explicitly uncertainty, time-varying cost functions, time-delays and multiple-time-scale dynamics. The proposed methods employ a variety of tools ranging from nonlinear systems analysis, through Lyapunov-based control techniques to nonlinear dynamic optimization. The applicability and performance of the proposed methods are demonstrated through a number of chemical process examples. The book presents state-of-the-art methods for the design of economic model predictive control systems for chemical processes.In addition to being mathematically rigorous, these methods accommodate key practical issues, for example, direct optimization of process economics, time-varying economic cost functions and computational efficiency. Numerous comments and remarks providing fundamental understanding of the merging of process economics and feedback control into a single framework are included. A control engineer can easily tailor the many detailed examples of industrial relevance given within the text to a specific application. The authors present a rich collection of new research topics and references to significant recent work making Economic Model Predictive Control an important source of information and inspiration for academics and graduate students researching the area and for process engineers interested in applying its ideas.

Optimal control theory is a technique being used increasingly by academic economists to study problems involving optimal decisions in a multi-period framework. This textbook is designed to make the difficult subject of optimal control theory easily accessible to economists while at the same time maintaining rigour. Economic intuitions are emphasized, and examples and problem sets covering a wide range of applications in economics are provided to assist in the learning process. Theorems are clearly stated and their proofs are carefully explained. The development of the text is gradual and fully integrated, beginning with simple formulations and progressing to advanced topics such as control parameters, jumps in state variables, and bounded state space. For greater economy and elegance, optimal control theory is introduced directly, without recourse to the calculus of variations. The connection with the latter and with dynamic programming is explained in a separate chapter. A second purpose of the book is to draw the parallel between optimal control theory and static optimization. Chapter 1 provides an extensive treatment of constrained and unconstrained maximization, with emphasis on economic insight and applications. Starting from basic concepts, it derives and explains important results, including the envelope theorem and the method of comparative statics. This chapter may be used for a course in static optimization. The book is largely self-contained. No previous knowledge of differential equations is required.

Designed primarily for economists and those interested in management economics who are not necessarily accomplished mathematicians, this text offers a clear, concise exposition of the relationship of linear programming to standard economic analysis. The research and writing were supported by The RAND Corporation in the late 1950s. Linear programming has been one of the most important postwar developments in economic theory, but until publication of the present volume, no text offered a comprehensive treatment of the many facets of the relationship of linear programming to traditional economic theory. This book was the first to provide a wide-ranging survey of such important aspects of the topic as the interrelations between the celebrated von Neumann theory of games and linear programming, and the relationship between game theory and the traditional economic theories of duopoly and bilateral monopoly. Modern economists will especially appreciate the treatment of the connection between linear programming and modern welfare economics and the insights that linear programming gives into the determinateness of Walrasian equilibrium. The book also offers an excellent introduction to the important Leontief theory of input-output as well as extensive treatment of the problems of dynamic linear programming. Successfully used for three decades in graduate economics courses, this book stresses practical problems and specifies important concrete applications.