3. The United Nations:

This book examines the role played by human rights in foreign policy and the determinants of foreign aid, documenting patterns in the relationships between trade, domestic politics and aid.

Populations for the sins of their rulers.

How US foreign policy affects state repression

A new lens on development is changing the world of international aid. The overdue recognition that development in all sectors is an inherently political process is driving aid providers to try to learn how to think and act politically. Major donors are pursuing explicitly political goals alongside their traditional socioeconomic aims and introducing more politically informed methods throughout their work. Yet these changes face an array of external and internal obstacles, from heightened sensitivity on the part of many aid-receiving governments about foreign political interventionism to inflexible aid delivery mechanisms and entrenched technocratic preferences within many aid organizations. This pathbreaking book assesses the progress and pitfalls of the attempted politics revolution in development aid and charts a constructive way forward. Contents: Introduction 1. The New Politics Agenda The Original Framework: 1960s-1980s 2. Apolitical Roots Breaking the Political Taboo: 1990s-2000s 3. The Door Opens to Politics 4. Advancing Political Goals 5. Toward Politically Informed Methods The Way Forward 6. Politically Smart Development Aid 7. The Unresolved Debate on Political Goals 8. The Integration Frontier Conclusion 9. The Long Road to Politics

Populations for the sins of their rulers.

How do different types of human rights violations -- physical, political and economic -- shape the extent to which donors restrict foreign aid to recipient countries? Foreign aid restriction is seen as an enforcement tool for countries to behave in specific ways as dictated by bilateral and multilateral donors. Therefore, I broadly hypothesize that if a government or a regime is engaging in a certain type of violation, the international community has the potential to use foreign aid restriction to manipulate the actions of the aid recipient government. Specifically, I theorize that when certain types of human rights violations are increasing, then states will incur restrictions from either one type of donor group or both donor groups. I test this argument by running two-way fixed effect regressions of physical integrity rights repression, civil liberties repression, private liberties repression, and social and economic rights repression on bilateral and multilateral aid restrictions from 25 OECD development assistance committee Western Democracies on 147 lower-to-middle income countries from 2007 to 2017. I find support for my theories, as the models demonstrate, that physical integrity rights violations and political and civil rights violations have an effect on both bilateral and multilateral aid restriction, but only in lower-income countries. This signifies that the international community is more willing to punish lower-income countries when there is an increase in physical integrity rights and political and civil rights repression.