This thesis is part of a project at the Naval Postgraduate School to assess the Computer Network Operations (CNO) threat of foreign countries. CNO consists of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Defense (CND). Threats to the nation's critical infrastructures come from an adversary using CNA and CNE to degrade, deny or destroy access to the information systems they depend upon. Defensive capabilities are also addressed since exploitation, attack, and defense are inherently related. The result of a successful cyber-attack upon these critical infrastructures has the potential to cripple a country's communications and other vital services, economic well-being, and defensive capabilities. The goal of this thesis is to develop a methodology for assessing the CNO threat of Iran. The methodology is based on open sources that can supplement classified information acquired by the intelligence community.

This volume develops information strategy as a construct equal in importance to military strategy as an influential tool of statecraft. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer explore three principal themes: the rise of the ‘information domain’ and information strategy as an equal partner alongside traditional military strategy the need to consider the organizational implications of information strategy the realm of what has been called ‘information operations’ (IO) - the building blocks of information strategy - has been too narrowly depicted and must be both broadened and deepened. Information Strategy and Warfare will be essential reading for students and practitioners of information strategy, as well as scholars of security studies and military strategy in general.

Cyber Mercenaries explores the secretive relationships between states and hackers. As cyberspace has emerged as the new frontier for geopolitics, states have become entrepreneurial in their sponsorship, deployment, and exploitation of hackers as proxies to project power. Such modern-day mercenaries and privateers can impose significant harm undermining global security, stability, and human rights. These state-hacker relationships therefore raise important questions about the control, authority, and use of offensive cyber capabilities. While different countries pursue different models for their proxy relationships, they face the common challenge of balancing the benefits of these relationships with their costs and the potential risks of escalation. This book examines case studies in the United States, Iran, Syria, Russia, and China for the purpose of establishing a framework to better understand and manage the impact and risks of cyber proxies on global politics.

This book explores current and emerging trends in policy, strategy, and practice related to cyber operations conducted by states and non-state actors. The book examines in depth the nature and dynamics of conflicts in the cyberspace, the geopolitics of cyber conflicts, defence strategy and practice, cyber intelligence and information security.