"Russia's invasion of Ukraine and swift annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 put the West on notice. To reassert the prestige lost since the Cold War's end, Russian President Vladimir Putin galvanized his political base with the promise of revanchism. The recent case of Ukraine is particularly alarming not only due to the forceful seizure of territory but also the "hybrid" warfighting techniques employed by Russian forces. The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, former Soviet Republics with fledgling Western governments located on Russia's immediate border and, importantly, members of the NATO alliance, seem a logical future target for aggression. For the United States and NATO, the costs of failing to deter Russia's revanchist ambitions are clear; either initiating a costly campaign to liberate an Alliance member or allowing Russia to remake the post-Cold War order. In the context of the recent conflict in Ukraine and the binding nature of NATO's collective security "guarantee," this paper will examine the steps the U.S. and NATO can reasonably take to deter Russia's revanchist ambitions in the Baltic republics, particularly from the threat of hybrid warfare. It will begin by providing a brief history of the Baltic Republics and the threat posed by Russia and hybrid warfare. Next, this paper will explore the strategic interests of the main protagonists and consider the requirements for an effective deterrent strategy. Finally, it will examine various ways and means across the various instruments of power that might be applied to deter Russian aggression in the Baltics, especially from the threat of hybrid warfare. In the final analysis, it is only through resolute action in implementing policy recommendations that encompass all instruments of power that the U.S. and NATO will be able to effectively deter Russian aggression and achieve their strategic interests in the region."--Abstract.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and swift annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 put the West on notice. To reassert the prestige lost since the Cold War's end, Russian President Vladimir Putin galvanized his political base with the promise of revanchism. The recent case of Ukraine is particularly alarming not only due to the forceful seizure of territory but also the "hybrid" warfighting techniques employed by Russian forces. The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, former Soviet Republics with fledgling Western governments located on Russia's immediate border and, importantly, members of the NATO alliance, seem a logical future target for aggression. For the United States and NATO, the costs of failing to deter Russia's revanchist ambitions are clear; either initiating a costly campaign to liberate an Alliance member or allowing Russia to remake the post-Cold War order.In the context of the recent conflict in Ukraine and the binding nature of NATO's collective security "guarantee," this paper will examine the steps the U.S. and NATO can reasonably take to deter Russia's revanchist ambitions in the Baltic republics, particularly from the threat of hybrid warfare. It will begin by providing a brief history of the Baltic Republics and the threat posed by Russia and hybrid warfare. Next, this paper will explore the strategic interests of the main protagonists and consider the requirements for an effective deterrent strategy. Finally, it will examine various ways and means across the various instruments of power that might be applied to deter Russian aggression in the Baltics, especially from the threat of hybrid warfare. In the final analysis, it is only through resolute action in implementing policy recommendations that encompass all instruments of power that the U.S. and NATO will be able to effectively deter Russian aggression and achieve their strategic interests in the region.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The Baltic Security Strategy Report provides an indepth security review of the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As highlighted in this important work, the Baltic States' various national and collective strategies to address recurring regional threats since achieving statehood over a hundred years ago present notable case studies useful to contemporary policymakers and defense planners. Scholars Olevs Nikers and Otto Tabuns based this report on a series of discussions and workshops involving key European and American experts and stakeholders engaged in Baltic regional security matters. The participating experts assessed current challenges pertaining to defense and deterrence, societal security, economic security and cyber security. In addition to exploring the security considerations of each of the three Baltic States, the workshop discussions and resulting papers collected in this report specifically examine avenues of subregional cooperation that may prove more potent than individual national effort in certain fields. Consequently, the authors provide a detailed list of recommendations on how to proceed with a more coherent, goaloriented, and efficient regional cooperation strategy that serves to buttress the security of each of the Baltic States and the Transatlantic community more broadly. The report is a rich guide to issues and opportunities of Baltic intraregional security, and a valuable resource for policymakers, advisors, scholars and defensesector professionals on both sides of the Atlantic.

Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States' role in Europe. This CSIS report examines the U.S. force posture in Europe---including the military capabilities, personnel, infrastructure, and agreements that support defense operations and plans---and makes recommendations for future U.S. posture. It finds that the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression.

Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.

In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NATO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots and re-calibrate itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. At the same time, cooperation between Russia and the West has not collapsed altogether coordinate on issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme. Clearly, tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations cannot be ruled out. The contributions to this volume, the result of an international conference jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, analyze the dramatic shift in Europe’s strategic context and explore the question of whether Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating on issues of mutual concern.