In this book, Soviet expert Raymond L. Garthoff makes use of unique, newly available material-- including a complete file of the confidential Soviet General Staff journal-- to illuminate the development of Soviet military thinking.

En analyse af Sovjetunionens sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitiske synspunkter set i lyset af de tilsvarende amerikanske.

Originally published in 1953, Soviet Military Doctrine by Soviet analyst Raymond L. Garthoff was prepared as part of the research program undertaken for the United States Air Force by The RAND Corporation. At the time of its first publication, Soviet Military Doctrine was the most complete and authoritative study available of the basic military science of the USSR. “Garthoff again joins the debate on nuclear deterrence and Moscow’s military intentions. He draws on previously confidential Soviet sources—including a complete file of the Soviet general staff journal—to interpret new developments and changes in the Kremlin’s strategic policy. Highly recommended for academic libraries.”—James R. Kuhlman, University of Georgia Library, Athens

Russia is a post-communist country struggling to adapt to the modern world economically and politically. In the twenty-first century, Russia faces postmodern social, cultural, and political problems with its old policy of deterrence. For Russia's political leaders and military planners, three scenarios define their postmodern setting: 1) the world's leading military and economic powers, with the exception of China, are market-based economies and political democracies; 2) the revolution in military affairs, based on advances in information, electronics, and communications, is driving both civil and military technology innovation; and 3) the Cold War's fundamental war-fighting premises, such as deterrence based on nuclear weapons and on conventional armed forces organized and trained for massive wars of attrition, have changed radically. These points' implications for future Russian strategy are profound, Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Rainow argue. Russia faces an increased presence of its former adversary, the United States, in adjacent territories; an increasingly assertive NATO, which includes many of Moscow's former allies; and continued fighting in Chechnya. Ominously, China aspires to overtake Russia as the world's second-ranked military power and establish its hegemony over the Pacific basin. In short, Russia confronts a radically new political and military world order that demands adapting to postmodern thinking about deterrence and defense. The danger is that Russia, realizing that it lags behind in leveraging modern technology for military purposes and that it must scrap its dependence on conscription, now relies on nuclear weapons as its first line of deterrence against either nuclear or conventional attack.

Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced then-use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived at and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.

Current NATO military strategy is based on the policy of flexible response that U.S. and European politicians endorsed in 1967; for over 15 years, no fundamental changes in NATO's defense strategy have occurred. If NATO cannot stop a Warsaw Pact aggression conventionally, it continues to threaten a gradual and controlled nuclear escalation of both theater and strategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts now question the fundamental principles underlying NATO's policy and strategy, given the enormous changes that have occurred in the strategic environment between 1967 and 1984. The contributors to this book examine the recent proposal by Samuel Huntington, who advocates that NATO adopt a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy based on offensive military actions deep into Eastern Europe. In evaluating this new proposal, the authors analyze the potential impact that it would have on U.S. and NATO military doctrine, assess probable European and Soviet reactions to NATO adopting a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy, and address the linkages existing between conventional and nuclear strategy. In the final chapter, the editors consider the policy, strategy, and force structure questions raised in the book and recommend policy options for the United States.